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INTRODUCTION 
My purpose in undertaking to study the law of libel in Massa-
chusetts was to fill a gap which exists in the iiterature. Much has 
. 
been written about the libel law in general - indeed 1 there are even 
works aimed at the layman journalist. Most studies~ however 1 are 
written by jurists and lawyers 1 for jurists and lawyers. Long digressions 
on fine points of the law 1 much Latin phraseology; and a logic of 
presentation and language peculiar to legal exposition make these 
tomes difficult going for the laity. 
The works which are aimed at the intelligent layman are designed 
to present an overall view of the statutes and judicial precedents and 
to cite general principles that apply to the American legal scene in 
general. The law of libel is too complicated and too vast to permit a 
thorough analysis of fifty states in one general study. Thus, the 
need for a study concentrated on the prinqiples on the libel laws of 
one state and designed for the edification of an intelligent laity became 
obvious. Quite naturally, I chose to conduct such an investigation 
in Massachusetts, my home state. 
From general studies such as Frank Thayer's Legal Control of the 
Press 1 and legal treatises such as Odgers and Ritson's Odgers on Libel 
I' ,I 
'I 
I' 
I 
I 
'I 
I. 
and Slander, I gleaned a general knowledge of the law of libel, the 
principles, logic, and problems involved. From historical works on 
the Massachusetts press, Duniway's The Development of Freedom 
of the Press in Massachusetts, for example, I gained an insight into 
the Colonial environment from which present legal thought evolved. 
There remained then the most tedious and difficult operation - a 
thorough research into Massachusetts legislation and court reports. 
Many research hours were utterly fruitless. It was not unusual to 
read through twenty or thirty cases to find even one relevant to this 
study. 
This was far from the simple matter or running to the nearest 
law library to ta~e copious notes on laws and cases, which I had 
envisioned on undertaking this thesis. One expects that as one 
pursues a subject principles and meanings will fall into a logical 
and simple pattern. The law, however, is a vastly complicated 
discipline, full of pitfalls for the unsuspecting laity; at times one 
suspects there to be more exceptions than rules. In many instances, 
it is impossible to learn the final disposition of a case. It is even 
difficult sometimes to discover the context of the original libel for 
which suit was brought, for example, where a case has come to a 
higher court on a legal technicality. 
The ~tudy of one case may send one backward through pre-
cedents for a few centuries. If one is curious enough, one can easily 
I 
J 
2 
find himself back at the embryonic "Lawes and Libertyes" of 1648. It 
is for this reason that the first four chapters of this thesis are devoted 
to the historical background. The present law becomes much more 
intelligible when viewed in an historical framework. · From the early 
deportation of dissenters 1 through the Bill of Rights and beyond 1 the 
fight for freedom of expression and modification of the libel laws is 
. 
a fascinating study. 
The actual composite of statutory and common law in Massa-
! 
I chusetts is a montage of progression and regression. Antiquated I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
I 
! 
' 
I 
I 
!I 
'I 
I 
statutes on obscene and blasphemous libel are juxtaposed with the 
most modern legislation on group libel to protect minorities and 
up-to-date consideration of the special legal position of radio and 
television networks. 
The main concern of this thesis is 1 of course 1 the state of 
Massachusetts. An occasional reference to legislation and decision 
in other states is made where such would serve to emphasize a 
point or identify Massachusetts with a minority ruling or an unique 
law; .-
3 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
CHAPTER I 
THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND: SUPPRESSION 
Introduction 
The early rulers of the Massachusetts Bay Colony were strongly 
anti-democratic, opposed to religious freedom, and had no trust in 
public intelligence. Opposition was promptly squelched by banishing 
its leaders. These repressive policies set the tone of colonial Massa-
chusetts until constitutional freedoms were enacted. 
Legislative and Judicial System 
Massachl!setts freemen were quick to demand a voice in their 
government and very early adopted a representative system of two houses 
in which the speakers became equal with the governor. The governor 
and magistrates were the upper house of the legislature, acting as an 
executive council and, in a judicial capacity, sitting as the court of 
assistants. "Thus it fell to a portion of the legislative body to interpret 
and enforce the statutes they helped enact. " 1 This practice arrested 
the development of any sharp distinction between legislative and court 
decision. 
The government fostered and protected the church, receiving 
moral support in return. The government exercised authority over the 
"outer" man; the church, over the "inner" man. All portions of church 
organization were subject to secular supervision and control, while 
its doctrines and disciplines received the sanction of the law. Heresy 
in the church became treason to the s tate . 2 
There was no professionally trained class of lawyers. English 
. 
legal treatises were cited for illustration ; not authority. English pre-
cedents were followed with presentment by a grand jury in criminal 
cases, and trial by a petty jury in civil and criminal cases. 3 
The criminal laws were Mosaic , especially where a death 
penalty was imposed. The manner of execution was English, not 
Hebraic. Lesser offenses bore humiliating punishments. Crime and 
sin were equated, making repentance necessary. Private wrongs were 
often addressed in criminal prosecutions. 4 
. Jury participation was more active than in England. Juries took 
a more independent attitude, particularly in the interpretation of the law. 
Court costs were fees due from the plaintiff and were measured by the 
amount of damages recovered. Cases were usually terminated at one 
court . 5 
The Massachusetts colonists did not consider the English law 
binding. The General Court statutes were positive I often scripture-
oriented. Some English laws were adopted I particularly in institutions, 
judicial proceedings 1 legal forms 1 and personal and property rights. 6 
5 
II 
I' 
II 
~ 6 
ll 
Certain notions of theocratic government, moral and religious 
duties, and criminal liability were drawn from the Mosiac code. A 1 
third colonial element was added, partly archaic, partly advanced, 
resulting in a curious blending of all three elements into a new legal 
system. 7 
Early Regulation of Opinion 
Although the Puritans had lived under persecution and proscription 
in Eng land, the colonial experience did not include a plea for free 
discussion. They considered it a matter of common sense to stamp out 
heresy and sedition. Even before the introduction of the printing press 
tbere were many prosecutions for opinions. As early as 1629, Governor 
Endicott exp~lled John and Samuel Brown for ecclesiastical dissension 
in the first episode of what was to be a long chain of regulation of 
opinion. 8 
Roger Williams was involved in many such controversies. 
In 1635 he was examined by the General Council (sitting as a court) 
and given time to reconsider his unorthodox views. Meanwhile, the 
town of Salem was refused a land grant because Williams taught in a 
church there. He wrote to other churches in the state, u!"ging them to 
rebuke such oppression by the magistrates. He was promptly banished 
for disseminating "newe and dangerous opinion.s against the authoritie 
of magistrates. " 9 
! 
I 
I 
7 
In 16371 Anne Hutchinson instituted women's meetings criticising 
ministers. She acquired a large following 1 and political parties formed in 
agreement or disagreement of her doctrines. She was excommunicated 
from her Boston church, and banished by the magistrates. 10 I 
I 
The first printing press in the colonies was brought to Massachu-
setts from England by the Reverend John Glover in 1639. Little informa-
. 
tion is available about the next few years·, but there was, no doubt, 
some supervision by the authorities. In 1649 Glover's widow married 
Henry Dunster, the first president of Harvard, who took over management 
of the press. The General Council may have exercised control, but 
in 1649 an attempt to establish a board of licensers failed. 11 
Incidents between 1641 and 1662 portray the tendency to restrict 
free discussion in the Bay State. In 1642 Richard Saltonstall was forced 
by the General Court to acknowledge his error in publishing a pamphlet 
against a proposed legislative action. Samuel Groton and his associates 
were convicted in 1643 of blasphemy and denial of the civil authority 
of Massachusetts. The judg-es stressed the dangers of such opinions 
and he was restrained, on penalty of death, from spreading blasphemy 
and heresy. 12 
The legalization of the Presbyterian Church in England in 1645 
set off demands for relaxation of church and state government rules in 
the Commonwealth. Civic leaders petitioned the General Council for 
a settled form of government according to the laws of England 1 and for 
·-
recognition of those outside the Puritan Church. The General Court's 
answer to this petition vindicated the government and the laws of 
Massachusetts, and its own proceedings in civil and ecclesiastical 
affairs. The petitioners threatened to appeal to Parliament, whereupon 
the Court arraigned them for false, scandalous, and seditious repre-
sentations. They denied the jurisdiction of the Court and appealed tq 
England. Heavy fines only incited more activity I and the petitioners 
'I 
I 
I 
,I 
I 
I 
finally sent a representative -to England. Parliament refused to interfere, ! 
and the Commonwealth remained independent. 13 
"The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes" 
In 1635 the General Court had appointed four persons "to make 
a draught of such !awes as they shall think needful for the well ordering 
of this plantacion [ sic] • " Much disagreement resulted and the 
"Body of Liberties" prepared in 1641 was never adopted. A significant 
measure in the legal development of the state occurred in 164 7 with 
I 
I 
I 
II 
'I ,. 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
"The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes . " This body of law stands II 
at the basis of all Massachusetts legislation and influenced that of II 
the other colonies. 14 j 
I 
i 
tl 
This legislation was partially a declaration of general principles 
such as later formulated in bills of rights, and partially specific pro-
visions of positive law, apparently compiled from the scriptures , the 
! 
Magna Carta, and the statutory and common law of England. These 
• 
-
II 
I 
were intended for the guidance of the General Court in framing laws 
and of the magistrates in applying them. 15 
-
Capital crimes included "idolatrie," witchcraft, blasphemy, 
murder, "poysoning," bestiality, sodomy, adultery, man-stealing, 
bearing false witness, "conspiracie," "child curse or smite parent," 
"rebellious son," 16 and rape. 
Certain of these early laws restricted freedom of speech and 
serve to point up the suppressive foundations of the law in coloniai 
Massachusetts. Lying, defamation of authorities, and profane swearing 
were punishable by fines, imprisonment, banishment, and other peculiar-
ly Puritan chastisements such as the stocks, lashings, etc. The con-
struction and underlying logic of these laws are most interesting as 
prototypes of the suppressive measures typical in early Massachusetts. 
Blasphemy was punishable by death. (A law against blasphemy 
is stil~ on the books in this state. The penalty, however, has been 
greatly reduced - one year in- jail or $300!) 
If any person within this juris diction, whether 
Christian or Pagan, shall wittingly and willingly 
presume to blaspheme the holy name of God, Father, 
Son, or Holy Ghost, with direct, express, presump-
tuous 1 or high-handed blasphemy I either by willful 
or obstinate denying the true God, or His Creation I 
or Government 1 or the World , or shall curse God in 
like manner, or reproach the holy Religion of God as 
it were but a politick device to keep ignorant men in 
awe, or shall utter any other kinds of Blasphemy of 
the like nature and degree, they shall be put to death. 
(Levit. 24:15.16). 17 
/' 
9 
--
II 
The law regarding lying embodies somwthing akin to a libel 
law, . combining criminal libel, civil libel, and lying in general in 
one statute: 
Whereas truth in words as well as in actions is 
required of all men, especially of Christians who 
are the professed servants of the God of Truth; and 
whereas all lying is contrary to truth, and some 
sorts of lyes are not only sinful! (as all lyes are) 
but also pernicious to the publick-weal, and in-
jurious to particular persons; it is therefore ordered 
by this Court and Authorities thereof, 
That everie person of the age of discretion (which 
is accounted 14 years) who shall wittingly and 
willingly make, or publish any Lye which may be 
pernicious to the publick-weal, or tending to the 
damage or injurie of any particular person, or with 
intent to deceive and abuse the people with false 
news or reports; and the same duly proved in any 
Court or before any one Magistrate . (who hath 
heerby power graunted to hear and determin all 
offences against the Law) Such person shall be 
fined for the first offence 10 shillings, or if the 
partie be unable to pay the same then to be set in 
the stocks so long as the said Court or Magistrate 
shall appoint, in some open place not exceeding 
two hours. For the second offence in that kinde 
wherof any shall be legally convicted, the sum of 
20 shillings, or be whipped upon the naked body not 
exceeding 15. And if yet any shall offend in like 
kinde, and be legally convicted therof, such person, 
male or female shall be fined 10 shillings a time more 
than formerly; or if the partie so offending be unable 
to pay, then to be whipped with five or six more stripes 
than formerly not exceeding 40 at any time. 18 
Another statute singles out judges for protection from 
defamation: 
10 
This court being sensible of the great disorder 
growing in this Common-Weal thru the contempts 
cast upon the Civil Authoritie, which willing 
to prevent, doe order and decree: 
That whosoever shal henceforth openly and willingly 
defame any Court of justice, or the Sentences or 
proceedings of the same, or any of the Magistrates 
or other Judges of any such Court in respect of 
any Act or Sentence therin passed, and being there-
of lawfully convicted in any General Court or Court 
of Assistants shall be punish.ed for the same by Fine, 
Imprisonment, Disfranchisement , or Bannishment as 
the quality and measure of the offence shall deserve. 
And if any magistrate or other member of any Court 
shall use any reproachful or un-beseeming speeches 
or behaviour towards any Magistrate, Judge, or 
Member of the Court in the face of said Court, he 
shall be sharply reproved by the Governor or other 
principle Judge of the same Court for the time being. 
And if the quality of the offence by such as shall 
deserve a farther censure, or if the person so re-
proved shall reply again without leave, the same 
Court may proceed to punish any such offense by 
Fine or Imprisonment, or it shall be presented and 
censured at the next Superior Court. 19 
More Prosecutions for Dissension 
In 1650 William Pynchon's pamphlet, "The Meritorious Price 
of Our Redemption, " created the first serious incident. The General 
Court found the book "erronyous and hereticle" and ordered copies to 
be burned. Pynchon was forced to make a partial retraction while the 
General Court granted him more time to reconsider. He finally escaped 
to England, and missed being the first to be prosecuted for his opinion 
in print. 20 
~----------------------------
11 
• 
I 
II 
I 
I 
·-
j' 
j12 
Anabaptists had been banned in the Commonwealth in 1644, 
but in 1651 a few came from Rhode Island to spread their doctrines. 
Dunster himself was prosecuted for Anabaptist sermons and was con-
victed for breaking the peace. His important position made the 
situation grave indeed. In 1654 the General Court voted that officers 
of the college and selectmen of the towns should not permit persons of 
unsound doctrines to teach. Dunster refused to stop his Baptist 
sermons and was forced to resign as president of Harvard. 21 
The same year, the General Court ordered books of Quaker 
teachings to he -surrendered and burned . A few years later two women 
arrived in Massachusetts as vanguards of a "Quaker Invasion." Their 
books were seized and burned, the women imprisoned and deported. 
Citizens were again ordered to give up Quaker books on penalty of 
fine and imprisonment. 22 
· John Elliot was forced by the legislature in 1661 to retract 
"such expressions as doe to manifestly scandalize the government of 
England." His book, "The Christian Commonwealth," was burned. 
The government's persecution of Baptists and Quakers began in the 
1650's and lasted through the century . The persecution was religiously 
inspired, but legally grounded in part on their censure of government 
I 
and tendency to disturb the peace, synonomous with seditious utterances. , 3 
The controversies which occurred between 1639 and 1662 show 
no recognition of the general right of freedom of discussion or of any 
--
special right of freedom of the press. There is a "tempta tion to 
speak of the 'ancient liberty of printing' because no record of formal 
censorship exists for 24 years after the first press in Massachusetts, 
but no such liberty existed in the real sense . u24 
. ·
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-
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CHAPTER II 
THE RISE OF CENSORSHIP 
A Shifting Control of the Press 
In 1662 the General Court passed the first formal act for 
restrictive censorship of the Massachusetts press: 
For prevention of irregularities and abuse to 
the authority of this country by the printing 
presse, it is ordered that henceforth no copie 
shall be printed but by the allowance first 
had and obtained under the hands of Captain 
Daniel Gookin and Mr. Jonathan Mitchel, un-
til this court shall take further order therin. 1 
This resembled in spirit an English statute 2 passed the same 
year, · giving the crown the right to regulate the press by express pro-
visions framed on- the model of the Star Chamber and Commonwealth 
ordinances and "may have been designed to be a simplified copy of 
the English system." 3 
But the next year, the General Court passed the following 
resolution: 
It is ordered that the printing presse be at 
liberty as formerly, till this court shall take 
further ord~r, and the late order is heereby 
repealed. 
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At this time, the only printing establishment belonged t o 
Harvard, under the direction of the president. Private commercial 
ownership of the press began in 1665 when Marmaduke Johnson 
brought a press from England. He tried to set up a printing shop in 
Boston. The General Court immediately passed a bill which allowed 
no presses except in Cambridge, and no printing except by permission, 
. 
under penalty of forfeiture of the press. 5 
In 1667 an amendment was proposed which would allow presses 
to be set up anywhere, requiring a license only for books designed for 
public sale. The measure, however, failed to pass. 6 
Johnson then petitioned to move his press from Cambridge to 
Boston and was refused. In 1668 he was convicted for an unlicensed 
publication. He was finally granted permission to print in Boston 
in 16 7 4, the General Court providing additional licensing agents to make 
certain all requirements were met. Johnson died shortly thereafter. 
·John Foster took over for an undisturbed period of seven years. 7 
In 1679 Charles II dissolved Parliament and left the press in 
England free from statutory restriction, but the situation in Massachu-
setts remained unchanged. 8 
The loss of the colony charter transferred the control of the 
press from representatives of the people of the Commonwealth to 
,I appointed agents of the British crown. Edmund Andros became 
11 governor of New Engiand in 1686, and the people of the Bay Colony 
I 
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began to feel the restraints imposed by England. 
John Wise and five assistants were tried for sedition the 
following year for declaring that a tax not levied by the Assembly 
was contrary to the Magna Carta and did not have to be paid. 10 
In 1689 the Andros government was overthrown and resumption 
of authority under the colony charter once again put printing in the 
11 hands of the General Court. 
Samuel Green was authorized to publish a ·broadside, The 
Present State of the New English Affairs, to keep the people informed 
about public affairs. In 1690 an unlicensed sheet called Publick 
Occurrences Both Foreign and Domestick was published by Benjamin 
Harris. The sheet contained a statement of intent to publish once a 
month. This very first is sue, however, ran an account of the French 
and Indian War repugnant to the government, and so proved to ;:be 
the last. The legislature promptly resolved to prohibit "anything in 
print without a license first obtained by government to grant same." 12 
In 1692 the provincial charter went into operation, and control 
of the press was once again in the hands of the royal governors. 
Printing was still confined to Boston and Cambridge. 13 
The Trial of Thomas Maule 
Thus far the provincial government was concerned with 
maintaining restrictive censorship, but in 1695, in a different sort of 
17 
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contest, Thomas Maule, a Salem Quaker, won an acquittal in the 
first criminal trial in Massachusetts for a printed libel. Maule's 
trial, even though the first of such trials in Massachusetts and 
hailed as a precurser of the famous Zenger case, actually was "a 
matter of conscience rather than that of a free press" to some historians. Hl 
Maule's publication bears the cumbersome title, Truth Held 
Forth and Maintained According to the Te.stament of the Holy Prophets, 
Christ and his Apostles Recorded in the Holy Scriptures With Some 
Account of the Judgements of the Lord Lately Inflicted Upon New 
England by Witchcraft. Maule was unable to obtain a license in 
Boston, and the book was printed in New York. Copies soon began to 
filter into Massachusetts. The work was largely a defense of Quaker 
tenents and criticism of the Puritan Theocracy for their persecution of 
the Quakers. It contained also a severe criticism of provincial 
authority and, incidentally, some surprisingly liberal views on witch-
craft. Maule was arrested and copies of his book seized and burned. 15 
Maule insisted his statements were true, whereupon he was 
denounced by the judge as a "horrible lyar." The court probably in-
tended to try him for publication only, but the fierce argument that 
followed enlarged the scope of the complaint. The grand jury indicted 
Maule not only for publishing the book but for "saying what he did 
before the honorable court at Ipswich." 16 At the trial some months 
later, the court overruled all pleas and Maule was left to "say for 
18 
himself." His defense arguments and berating of the judges would, 
in present law, subject him to jail for contempt of court. Maule 
argued that his book was not contrary to sound doctrine, nor inconsis-
tant with the Holy Scriptures of Truth. He even challenged the court 
to prove that he was the Thomas Maule in question! The jury returned 
a verdict of "not guilty according to the indictment." The judges wer-e 
hardly satisfied with such a verdict, but were forced to set him free. 
Maule took full advantage of a shadowy doubt of proof of publication 
and played on the emotions of the jury in likening the evidence against 
him to that used in witchcraft trials. In his closing appeal, the Quaker 
put the responsibility on the jury and not upon the judges and "raised 
a point by means of which Zenger was acquitted a generation later. " 17 
The Zenger trial in 177 5 was heralded as the foundation of 
freedom of the press in America, but Maule 's trial, forty years earlier, 
raised· the question of the right to print and publish criticism of 
government. In both cases the court was hostile and attempted to in-
fluence the jury. In both cases the final telling point that brought 
acquittal was that the responsibility for justice lay upon the jury and 
was not to be divided with the court. Considering Maule's position 
as a leader of an unpopular religious sect and that the indictment in-
vo1ved both religious and political considerations, and considering that 
- I Zenger was a popular idol in New York and defended by one of the 
ablest lawyers of the day in a court room packed with sympathizers, 
~- ------------------------------------
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"it must be conceded that the Salem Quaker won the first victory for free-
dom of the press in America under conditions that reflect great credit upon 
the puritan jury that set him free. "18 
Censorship Ignored in Partisanship 
In 1699 Benjamin Colman, pastor of a new church in Boston, 
published a notice explaining his views • . Increase Mather published 
an antidote, and Colman answered. Neither book was licensed, but 
no action was taken. The decay of censorship was evidently setting 
in. It would seem that if authors were in favor with government 
policies, or did not indulge in controversy, a license might be safely 
dispensed with, although the official form still required it. A different 
policy existed regarding news, however. Although licensing had been 
abandoned in England in 1685, the colonial governor's instructions 
still required him to maintain licensing. Therefore, the News-Letter of 
1704 was "published by authority." This publication arose out of 
Postmaster John Campbell's custom of writing letters to the colonial 
governors. In 1704, his communiques were ,printed in the form of a 
regular publication and generally regarded as the first newspaper in 
America. It avoided any offense to the government and for 15 years 
was the only newspaper in Massachusetts . 19 
~,The term of Governor Dudley, 1702 - 1716, saw an unusual 
development of partisanship. Much use was made of the Massachusetts 
,, 
I' ,, 
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press for political warfare. The News-Letter was not open for discussion, 
I 
but many controversial pamphlets were issued without license. Evidently 
Dudley did not maintain his control as instructed. In 1715, between the 
expiration of his term and a reinstatement order, Dudley's son published 
I 
;a w.iiOOJicartt:ii®g sttartt:eniilleffl: wfuic iiD was; suppressed . In ]7!5 :E:Judley retired . I 
The Council also- suppressed an article by his son-in-law, William • 
Dummer. 20 
These facts reveal a continued disregard of censorship in a 
time of political excitement, together with the continued unquestioned 
right of the council to summarily suppress any printed matter that 
displeased it. 
The thoroughness and directness of executive 
government in Massachusetts, corresponding 
to the provincial simplicity of all social insti-
tutions, kept the community free from characteris-
tic complications of libel trials and "taxes on 
knowledge" which hampered the English press of 
the period. 21 
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CHAPTER III 
THE GROWING FREEDOM 
Governor Shute • s Losing Battle 
The animated political controversl.es during Governor Samuel 
Shute's term 1 beginning in 1716 1 saw important developments in 
freedom of the press. Shute's dogged efforts to license the press met 
with increasing resistance by the legislature. The patriot party was not 
willing to concede the advantage of using the press for expression. 1 
In 1719 a controversy developed between the House and the 
Council over an impost bill. Each side published its views and justifica-
tions. Neither the Council nor the Governor questioned the right of 
the House to publish its proceedings. Neither I however I abandoned 
efforts to hold writers and publishers to careful handling of political 
and religious questions. 2 
Thus in 1719 it was still possible to invoke the power of 
censorship. John Checkley 1 a prominent Anglican minister I was pre-
vented from publishing a tract criticising the Calvanist doctrines. 
The legislature enacted a statute aimed at Checkley 1 compelling 
anyone "suspected to be disaffected to his Majesty or to His govern-
ment" to swear an oath of loyalty. 1Checkley refused to comply; he 
was convicted and fined. 3 
But the last 20 years of freedom of the press had had a great 
effect. The same year (1719), the House brought charges of gross 
misconduct in office against Governor Shute's surveyor of the woods 
for a speech asserting that the province was not properly conserving 
the forest for navy supplies. Despite Shute's request to the contrary, 
the House published a report about the surveyor. No action was taken, 
however, and henceforth there was no doubt that the House would 
I print its proceedings as it pleased. The exigencies of partisan war-
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fare required defiance of the governor's prerogatives. Since the attorney 
general and the Council took no responsibility on the grounds that there 
was no law to support prosecution, "it meant an official recognition that 
no legal censorship of the press existed in Massachusetts in 1720." 4 
Meanwhile, freedom of expression was growing in the newspaper 
world. Postmaster Campbell was displaced in 1719, but did not re-
linquish the News-Letter. His successor started the Boston Gazette, 
and a permanent rivalry resulted. Each succeeding postmaster took 
over the Gazette and Campbell continued his publication. Both sheets, 
however, were conservative publications, deferential to authority. 5 
In 1720 papers began printing anonymous advertisements which 
expressed political .Views. The practic~ mushroomed. Shute was un-
able to control these publications, but threats of criminal prosecutions 
made publishers cautious. Then, John Coleman's book on economic 
24 
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distress was printed. Shute brought it before the Council and charged 
that the book "reflected on the Acts and Laws of the Province ... 
tending to disturb the administration of the government and the public 
peace." The Council ordered Coleman's arrest, but the prosecution 
was dropped without explanation. 6 
The following year a similar prosecution was directed against 
. 
Benjamin Gray whose publication, according to the Council, contained 
"many vile, scandalous and abusive expressions ~ · which reflected on 
the government. Gray, meanwhile, adverti sed his book in the 
Gazette. The advertisement was viewed as a defiance and he was 
summoned to answer for it, as well as for his book. Gray apologized 
1 and the jury found no true bill. 7 
Concerned about the growing freedom of the press, Governor 
Shute in 1721 asked the General Court to endorse his censorship 
instructions from the Crown. The House r e plied by saying that if 
· proper methods had been taken to punish libelers, others would have 
been deterred. An act to prevent printing without a license from the 
Governor, they felt, might cause many inconveniences and dangerous 
circumstances for the people. This standpoint, however, may have 
I peen a means of preserving the House's own right to publish criticisms 
of government policies, rather than a direct support of freedom of the 
press. Notwithstanding the House's objections, the Council passed 
an "Act for preventing of Libels and Scandalous Pamphlets and for 
25 
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Punishing the Authors and Publishers thereof. 11 The House rejected 
the bill. The News-Letter published the full text of the debate, 
publically announcing that the press in Massachusetts was no longer 
subject to any licensing authority. 8 
That same year James Franklin started the New England Courant, 
which was not ~1 published by authority. II The Courant was far more • 
energetic and outspoken than its predecessors and, judging by the 
conservative times, a vehicle of sedition. The Courant particularly 
ridiculed the Reverend Increase Mather and Harvard - particularly 
when Mather was campaigning to prevent small pox innoculations. 
Mather denounced Franklin in the Gazett e; Franklin replied in the 
Courant. 9 
In 1722 an article in the Courant insinuated that the government 
was not cooperating in capturing a pirate ship off the coast. The 
General Court denounced the article and ordered Franklin jailed. He 
fell ilE in prison and petitioned for release. It was denied. The Council 
tried to put newspapers under censorship again and passed an order 
that papers must be perused by the secretary. Franklin was put under 
100 pounds bond until the next session. The House refused to concur 
with the censorship order. Franklin, after his release, declared he 
had meant no affront on the government and would proceed with caution 
so long as he was· allowed to continue his business. Nevertheless, 
he followed this with a stinging satire in doggerel verse on the Genera} 
26 
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Court's act in imprisoning him. 10 
The opposition to Shute caused partisan division. Franklin 
would not be restrained. In 1723 Shute sailed for England, leaving 
Lt. Gov. William Dummer in charge. The Courant again denounced 
religious hypocrites, deprecated the political contentions of the day, 
a nd implied that Shute was in England against the interests of the 
province, proposing that agents be sent to England to vindicate the 
House. With Shute away, the branches of the General Court were 
able to get together. A committee of the Council and the House censored 
the Courant and recommended that Franklin be forbidden to print 
without supervision. A joint order was passed which Franklin ignored. 
He was arrested for contempt. Then, his brother Benjamin's name was 
substituted as editor, and the ruse was successful. The grand jury 
failed to indict him and the Courant continued until 1727. This was 
the last instance of an attempt to revive and enforce censorship in 
Massachusetts. 11 
The End of Licensing 
Shute's successor also came equipped with royal instructions 
to censor the Massachusetts press. Finally, in 1730, no such in-
structions were given to Gov. -Belcher. These new conditions in the 
province were recognized in two incidents. A council order passed in · 
1725 warned printers of Boston newspapers, on their peril, not to 
I 
I. 
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print anything about public affairs relating to war without orders from 
the government. This order plainly implied that other matters were 
quite publishable without permission. 12 
The same year an Episcopal minister complained to the 
Council that the Boston News-Letter had misrepresented him. The 
Council replied that newspapers were not being supervised by censor::;, 
an explicit repudiation of official responsibility for the press. But 
in 1729 the Council ordered newspapers to stop using the phrase 
"published by authority." 13 
The end of licensing was an important step, but there was 
still no exemption from arbitrary prosecution, no benefit of just libel 
laws, and no generally acknowledged right of persons to use the press 
for reasonable discussion of matters of public concern, which con-
stitute real freedom of the press. 14 
New Principles Advocated 
Meanwhile, an interesting development was taking place in the 
law of libel itself. John Checkley was indicted in 1724 for distributing 
his books containing "vile and scandalous passages reflecting on His 
Majesty's authority" - the same books he had been forbidden to print 
five years earlier. Checkley was convicted. He appealed to the 
Superior Court of Judicature and was given a new trial - and another 
conviction. The case was a landmark for, although the prosecution 
-
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won, the fight was a hard one and constituted the last instance in 
Massachusetts of legal persecution for defending Episcopacy. The 
trials. The jury brought in a special verdict:, saying Checkley was 
guilty iL the book was actually a false and scandalous libel. Its 
libelous character was left to the court to decide. The defense counsel 
argued that the judges were incompetent to decide on the question of 
. libel, that the jury should decide and, since they could not 1 Checkley 
should be acquitted . Thus a principle of law was advocated that 
Great Britain was not to recognize for 60 years 1 until the Fox Libel 
Act of 17 9 2 • 15 
After Franklin's departure and the end of the Courant 1 there was 
little of the spirited political controversies that marked his journalistic 
career. The disputes of the day were presented in newspapers by 
official speeches and writings on both sides, with no editorial comment. 
Then in 17 3 5 Thomas Fleet began to publish the Evening Post. The 
Post printed opposing views, but included much sarcastic commentary 1 
heaping personal abuse upon those who criticized Fleet. The paper 
was denounced by the clergy in particular as the "sink of sedition, 
error 1 and heresy." Fleet was careful, however 1 not to asperse 
government policies. But in 17 42 he printed an article that Parliament 
was reviewing papers relating to the war (between England and 
Spain) and that it was expected that Sir Robert Walpole would be 
taken into custody. The Council ordered the Attorney General to file 
an information against Fleet, circumventing the grand jury, and to 
prosecute him for "libelous reflections on His Majesty's administration" 
which tended to "inflame the minds of subjects here and disaffect 
them to His government." Fleet produced witnesses, and ensuing 
events proved the truth of his statements. The prosecution was con-
sequently dropped. The governor's attempt to circumscribe political 
reporting was evident, and newspapers were alerted to the necessity 
for literal accuracy. l6 
The General Court again demonstrated its power to restrain the 
press in 17 54 by punishing public criticism as a breach of privacy. 
An anonymous pamphlet, The Monster of Monsters, satirized the 
House debate on an unpopular excise bill. The book was seized and the 
House resolved that the author had perpetrated a "false, scandalous , 
libel, reflecting on the preceedings of the House in general and on 
many worthy men in particular, in breach of the privacy thereof. " 
Copies of "The Monster" were seized and burned. A warrant went out 
for the arrest of Daniel Fowle and his apprentice as suspected printers. 
They were brought before the bar of the House. They confessed and 
implicated Fowle's brother and Royal Tyler, a prom1nent merchant. 
Tyler was refused a lawyer and answered all questions with a refusal 
II 
to incriminate himself. He was denied bail, but was unaccountably 
released two days later, along with Fowle's apprentice. Fowle went 
to prison where he spent the time writing a narrative of his suffering. 
He was finally granted a petition for discharge to nurse his sick wife. 
He was supposed to return to jail, but with public sympathy on his side, 
he never did. The charges were dropped and the House left him alone, 
even when he published A Total Eclipse of Liberty, a book about his 
experience. Freedom of the press, however, was not the issue, but 
violation of the Magna Carta guarantee of personal liberty and due 
process of law. 17 
The administration of the French and Indiah Wars brought a 
rash of criticism from the Boston press. In 1756 the governor sent 
messages to both houses on the "licentiousness of the press," 
recommending strong measures to prevent "malignant libels." The 
General Court was willing to prosecute the offenders, but no action 
was taken. Newspaper warfare developed, exhibiting a growing 
boldness with the increasing intensity of political issues. 18 
Revolutionary Controversy 
The Revolutionary controversy gave increased impetus to the 
growing freedom of th~ press. Chief Justice Hutchinson (who later 
became governor) felt that libeling by the press wuld threaten the 
subversion of order. The grand jury constantly refused to indict for 
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libels on the governor, while Hutchinson persisted in his efforts. 
One charge, in 1767, urged the grand jury to note that libeling a 
person in public print was a crime of a high nature and even worse when 
directed against authority. The grand jury ignored him. In 1767 
Hutchinson defined freedom of the press: 
Pretty high Notions of the Liberty of the Press 
I am sensible, have prevailed of late among us; 
but it is very dangerous to meddle with and 
strike at this court. The Liberty of the Press is 
doubtless a very great Blessing; but this liberty 
means no more than a Freedom for every Thing to 
pass from the Press without License ... That 
is 1 you shall not be obliged to obtain a License 
from any Authority before the Emission of Things 
from the Press. Unlicensed Printing was never 
thought to mean a Liberty of reviling and calum-
niating all Ranks and Degrees of Men with Im-
punity 1 all Authority with Ignominy. - To carry 
this absurd Notion of the Liberty of the Press to 
the Length some would have it - to print every 
thing that is Libellous and Slanderous - is truly 
astonishing 1 and of the most dangerous tendency. 19 
This was an accurate and orthodox view I the only definition 
known in Anglo-American thought and law at the time. "There is no 
known evidence that anyone prior to 1798 thought otherwise." 20 
In 1768 the Boston Gazette ran an article by Dr. Joe Warren 
that referred to Governor Bernard as a hated enemy of the province. 
The Council deemed this seditious libel. Bernard appealed to the 
House; he wanted to take it to the grand jury. The House expressed 
regrets and resolved that: 
l 
The Liberty of the Press is a great Bulwark 
of the Liberty of the People. It is, there-
fore, the incumbent Duty of those who are 
constituted the Guardians of the People's 
Rights to defend and maintain it. 21 
Bernard ignored their advice to go no further and took the case 
to court. Chief Justice Hutchinson explained to the grand jury the 
tendency of criminal libel to disturb the peace and treaten the sub-
version of rule, thus coming close to high treason. He again defined 
freedom of the press as absence of prior censorship and license. He 
demanded an indictment, but the jury found no bill. Subsequent 
articles by Dr. Warren and Samuel Adams appeared, praising the 
House and th~ grand jury for vindicating freedom of the press. Adam's 
article ridiculed the doctrine of "the greater the truth, the greater the 
libel. " Again, in 17 6 8, Hutchinson tried to get the grand jury to indict, 
but by the next year he declared he was discouraged. Bernard appealed 
for help to the ministry in England, which passed the responsibility to 
the provincial government for permitting seditious libels to go un-
22 punished. 
In 1770 a committee of the Lords of Council for Plantation 
Affairs brought an indictment against Massachusetts "that seditious 
and libelous publications are encouraged and go unpunished, manifesting 
a design to stir up the people to acts of violence and opposition to the 
laws and the authOllity of Parliament." The General Court retorted that 
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much more libel existed in England. 23 
By 1771 the Council c ould not even enforce its own authority . 
Its members were elected by the Hou se, which had cleaned out most 
of the leading Tories . Yet , in 1771 and 1772, the Council stood with 
Hutchinson , now governor , in trying to get rid of incendiary writers. 
In 1771 Isaiah Thomas , publisher of the Massachusetts Spy, a paper . 
known as the "Sedition Foundry , " was summoned for a statement 
reflecting on the lieutenant governor . The ~stated that Lt. Gov. 
Oliver "stood recorded as a perjured traitor" and that Gov. Hutchinson 
should be dismissed and punished as an usurper. Thomas refused to 
answer the summons . He notified the Governor and their Honors that 
he was too busy! It was impossible to arrest him through popular 
agencies , so the Attorney General was ordered to prosecute Thomas at 
common law . The Attorney General replied by citing the Zenger case 
and the principle of truth as a defense to libel. The Chief Justice 
was still dwelling on the horrors of seditious libel , but the grand jury 
refused to indict Thomas. The Council took a chance and ordered the 
Attorney General to prosecute Thoma s by an information, thereby 
avoiding the grand jury. The plan was attacked by the popular party 
as a violation of the liberties of subject and of the press. The pro -
secution was dropped. The Council instead took petty revenge on 
Joseph Greenleaf, suspected to be the author of the article, and 
dismissed him from his position as a justice of the peace. 24 
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Later that year Thomas published an attack on George II fo r 
"corrupting the government." Hutchinson urged the indictment by 
information of seven persons involved. Recalling the public fury earlier, 
the Council advised the popular, but futile, approach of indictment by 
grand jury. The grand jury, of course, refus ed to return a true bill. 
Thomas warned that if the press were ever fettered, the next step wou:J.d 
be "padlocks on our lips." The point is that the press was not fettered 
during the revolutionary controversy, at least not the patriot press. 
Only one body possessed any actual power as well as authority, and 
that was the Assembly. 25 
The last years of debate over imperial and colonial rights 
brought a non-legal but real invasion of the rights of freedom of 
discussion. The question of freedom of the press became subordinate 
to issues of loyalty or disloyalty to one or the other party. The 
Boston Evening Post, Boston Gazette, and Massachusetts Spy were 
given up in 177 5. The Gazette and the §:Qy resumed in Watertown and 
Worcester. The News-Letter continued until the British were forced to 
evacuate in 1776, when the patriotic press had exclusive rights. 26 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE MODIFICATION OF THE LIBEL LAWS 
The Bill of Rights 
The people of Massachusetts were not drawn to consider the 
legal position of the press until the state constitution was under 
discussion . The rejection of the constitution in 1778 by the General 
Court was largely due to the omission of a bill of rights. The custom 
of including a bill of rights in colonial charters began in the first 
Plymouth colony. Similar sections were included in the charters of 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland I 
Rhode Island, the Carolinas, and New Jersey 1 entitling colonists to 
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the sa~e rights and liberties to which they were entitled as Englishmen. 1 II 
!I 
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·I I. 
I 
The First Continental Congress in 1774 issued a Declaration of 
Rights which gave English colonists five inviolable rights - repre-
sentative government, trial by jury, liberty of person, easy tenure of 
2 land 1 and freedom of the press : 
I The last right we mention regards freedom of the 
! !i press. The importance of this consists, besides 
I. 
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11 the advancement of truth, science, morality, and 
i! the arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal senti- 1 
:1 ment on the administration of government, its ready ~~ 
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communication of thought bet ween s ubject s 
and its consequential promise of union among 
them whereby oppressive officials are shamed 
or intimidated into more honorable and just 
modes of conducting affairs . 
The congress also declared that the colonists were entitled 
to life, liberty, and property, and had not surrendered these rights 
by emigration. They were entitled to the benefits of English statutes 
existing at the time of the colony and which they had by experience 
found applicable to their circumstances. This document became the 
basis for the bills of rights later incorporated into various state 
constitutions. 3 
In 1780 the Massachusetts constitution was adopted. It 
included a guarantee of press freedom: 4 
That liberty of the press is essential in the 
state. It ought not to be restricted in this 
Commonwealth. 
The provincial constitution of Massachusetts gave protection 
to freedom of the press, but recognized the law of criminal libel. 
Under the rule of the royal governors during the period of verbal war 
with England, no restraints were actually imposed. The governors 
and their councils tried prosecutions but , as we have seen, 5 grand 
juries were unwilling to indict. Public opinion against the government 
was too strong. Yet, in the free state of Massachusetts with 
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constitutional guarantees of press liberty , grand juries returned 
criminal libel indictments for some time . 6 
In 17 87 George Brock and Gideon Pond were indicted for 
libeling the governor, but their cases were never tried. Edmund Freeman 
was prosecuted in 1791 for a libel on a member of the legislature. 
The attorney general maintained that the constitutional guarantee meant 
only the absence of licensing, arguing that licentiousness must be 
distinguished from liberty. The defense attorneys did not challenge 
this view, nor did they ask for a ruling allowing truth in defense. They 
merely denied the licentiousness of the article and the tendency to 
breach the peace . They did try to prove the accuracy of Freeman's 
report, but the judges stressed the unlawfulness of words tending to 
breach the peace. Truth was no defense, and the free press not-
withstanding, licentiousness, falsehood, and verbal injury to the 
public were answerable in law. One judge was sympathetic with 
the idea of truth as a defense, but he reserved ruling. The jury re-
turned a verdict of not guilty. 
But a judicial construction of liberty of the press 
in the state was announced no different from 
Hutchinson in 17 68 nor the Superior Court in 
17 34. It merely affirmed that the constitutional 
provision of 17 89 was merely declaratory of the 
law as it had existed for 60 years, with an 
added prohibition of any possible re-establish-
ment of censorship. 7 
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Fr.:.. edom of the press, it would seem, would have t o depend 
on the liberality of officials and the independence of juries or public 
opinion. The character of the press at the time, however, was not 
likely to encourage the support of these . "Coarse personalities, 
vulgar ribaldry, malicious slanders were poured fourth until it seemed 
to sober- minded men that unrestrained freedom of discussion was 
leading to the triumph of anarchy . " 8 
The Sedition Act 
John Adams felt that freedom of the press might destroy 
liberty, and so approved the Sedition Act in 1798. Here, here-
presented the opinion of the dominant Massachusetts party. The 
governor and the General Court affirmed the constitutionality of 
the act . 9 
Thomas Adams, editor of the Boston Independent Chronicle, 
and his brother, Abijah, were the first indicted under the Sedition 
Act. Released on bail pending trial, they contin':led to blast the 
Adams administration and the act. In 1799 they attacked the Massa-
chusetts legislature for repudiating the Virginia Resolution which 
condemed the Sedition Act. The legislature declared that seditiousness 
of speech and the press was punishable on the principles of common 
law, that the state and federal constitutional protection meant only 
the right to utter and publish the truth by rational use, and not the 
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abuse, of liberty. Abijah demanded tha t Federalists expla in how 
legislators could be faithful to oaths to support the sovereignty of 
the Commonwealth if they had rejected the resolutions that claimed 
a state's right to decide on the constitutionality of the Sedition Act. 
His remarks were regarded as a charge that the legislature had per-
jured themselves in taking their oaths of office. 10 
The brothers were indicted at common law for seditiously 
libeling the General Court. Thomas was ill; only Abijah was t ried. 
His attorney admitted that wanton, flagrant abuses of the press were 
not protected by a guarantee of a free press, but said that no indict-
ment could be maintained for a libel against the state. He argued 
that the law of seditious libel was not suited to the spirit and 
genius of a republican form of government. De eming Blackstone's 
definition as vague, empty, and delusive, he declared that if Adams 
could be convicted, any offensive publication would be punished in 
the same manner and degree as if no guarantee of liberty existed, 
rendering the constitutional clause merely declaratory of the common 
law. The purpose of the clause was to render immunity to the 
strongest censure of government; a degree of licentiousness was 
inseparable from genuine freedom of the press. The attorney general 
argued that the constitutional clause was, indeed, only declaratory 
of the common law. The chief justice, in his charge to the jury, said 
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that the common law of England was the birthright of America. 
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Endorsing the attorney general, he said the defense argument was 
even more dangerous to the public peace than the libel in question. 
The jury found the paper libelous and Abij ah guilty of publication . He 
was sentenced to a month in jail. 11 
Similar prosecutions involved J. S. Lillie of The Constitutional 
Telegraph in 1802 and William Carleton of the Salem Register in 
1803 ~ Lillie was sentenced to three months in prison and $100 for 
libeling Justice Dana (the judge in the Adams case) in terms that tended 
to bring him into "great hatred, contempt, and disgrace." Carleton's 
trial was noteworthy, for the prosecuting attorney consented to the 
admission of evidence to prove the truth of the alleged libel. Carleton 
was found guilty, however, and sentenced to two months and $100. 12 
Legal Controversy 
These applications of harsh common law rules led to an effort 
in the legislature to secure mitigation. In 1804 the Senate passed 
"An Act Respecting Libels . " 13 
Section I. Be it enacted by the Senate and the 
House of Representatives, in General Court 
assembled, and by the authority of the same, 
that s:my person indicted for a Libel may give 
in evidence, in his defense I the truth of any 
matter charged in the indictment as libelous. 
Section II. And be it further enacted that in 
any trial for a Libel, as in other cases, the 
Jury 1 under the direction of the Court I may 
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find a general verdict deciding all questions of 
law and fact involved in the issue, or, if they 
think proper, they may find the facts in a special 
verdict and submit the law thereon to the deci -
sion of the Court. 
The proposed act was not passed by the House, so the rule 
prevailed that because truth was immaterial to the essence of a libel, 
a defendent would not be permitted to pr~ve truth. If the fact of 
publication was clear, the sole defense was an effort to show the ab-
sence of an intent to defame, together with a justifiable purpose in 
publishing. Section II was merely a declaration of the Massachusetts 
practice regarding jury function. 14 
The practice of freedom in the early Eighteenth Century was 
inconsistent with the doctrine of common law, unchanged by legis-
lation. In 1805 the Massachusetts House defeated a proposal to de-
prive Young and Minors of public printing rights. They had published 
in the New England Palladium "an indecent and libelous publication 
against the personal character of the President of the United States.'' 
A House committee reported that it was not expedient to rescind their 
printing contract, declaring that the preservation of the constitution 
and the laws depended on the knowledge people had of the conduct 
and integrity of public officers, and such knowledge was impossible 
without the unrestrained freedom of the press. The citizen has the 
right to form his own opinions and one may "publish the truth from 
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good motives and for justifiable ends, although it r eflect s on government , 
magistrates 1 and individuals," provided that abuse is cognizable by 
a judiciary tribunal which ought to interfere and punish. Every citizen 
·i 
I 
who makes a publication chargeable as libelous has a right to a jury I' 
I! 
I, trial and "the law of England on the subj act of libels, which holds 
I 
that the greater the truth, the greater the libel, is not the law of this l) 
I• 
·I land." 
15 
·! 
'I 
'i The adoption of the committee's report by the House had no 
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legal effect to change the law. The first adaptation to the new con-
ditions was not legislative, but judicial. William Clapp was con-
victed in 1807 for libeling an auctioneer. Clapp was not allowed to I 
,I 
·' l! 
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prove the truth. In a motion for a new trial, the defense argued that 
,, 
I the Massachusetts constitution had abrogated the common law doc-
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trine of libel; it was not libelous to publish the truth from good motives 
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'I I• I 
and for justifiable ends. A democratic government required the right 
to publish the truth. The court, therefore, could not deny the defense 
•' I' jl 
I the right to prove the truth. The attorney general cited Blackstone to 
!I 
I 
the contrary, but was not opposed to the admission of evidence tending 
·I !. II 
II 
to prove the truth of libels against public officials, government 1 and 
II 
II t, 
I 
candidates for public office. Chief Justice Parsons also cited Black-
stone 1 but added that the publication of the truth about the character 
of elective officers and candidates was not libel. However, the libel I 
'I 
in question was on an appointive officer 1 and truth was inadmissible! 16 1; 
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The case received no particular attention, but three years later 
a grand jury conducted an investigation of the licentiousness of the 
press. Abijah Adams of the Independent Chronicle was indicted for 
reflections on the character of a chief justice. The justice I disdaining 
protection of his position as an appointive officer, interceded with the 
attorney general to request that there should be no objection to the 
admission of evidence which might prove the truth of any publication 
against him. This action emphasized the uncertainty and the irrational 
basis of the libel- law . 17 
Agitation over threatened prosecutions, coupled with severe 
newspaper criticism of judge-made law 1 led Governor Gerry (of 
gerrymander fame) to seek a partisan advantage from the discussion. 
He brought before the legislature in 1812 a report on the prevalence 
of libels in the Boston press. It appeared from the report that libels 
fell into two classifications: those in which the truth could and could 
not be given in justification. No account had been taken of libels on 
foreign governments, of distinguished foreigners, or aspersions on 
other editors. Yet, they noted 253 libelous articles, 236 in Federalist 
papers and 17 in Republican organs. For all these, there were only 10 
indictments and three convictions, the grand jury having refused to 
return true bills on seven. The governor lauded freedom of the press, 
:i but said that licentiousness should be checked and the uncertainties 
of the libel law remedied by statute. He added that criticism of 
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non-elective judges ought to be as free as possible . 18 
The House promptly passed "An Act declaratory of the law on 
the subject of libels" which said that in all cases of public prosecu-
tion for libel on persons holding appointive office, the defendant may 
give the truth in evidence, provided it had a tendency to show the 
person unfit for office. The Senate, nearing the end of the legislative 
session, had no time for legislation, but did pass a resolution sympathiz-
ing with the recommendation. Meanwhile, unfortunately, Gerry was 
defeated for re-election. The new administration declared that Gerry's 
procedures in investigating libels were a dangerous innovation, even 
pretending he was endangering the freedom of the press. 19 
The uncertainties of the law were again debated in 1820. The 
Constitutional Convention tried to include in the Declaration of Rights 
a proposal that in prosecutions for libels against public men, the truth 
might be given in evidence, and the jury might determine both law and 
fact. The chief argument against the proposal was that it was un-
necessary, since the law already provided such a measure. The Con-
20 
vention refused to endorse the proposal. 
Cases during the next few years revealed a lack of agreement. 
In 1822 I Judge Josiah Quincy of the Boston Municipal Court admitted 
evidence to prove the truth of an alleged libel on a Methodist preacher. 
He declared that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press 
authoriz.ed the publication, for justifiable ends, of facts that in common 
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law had been deemed libelous. The ruling led to the acquittal of 
Joseph T. Buckingham of the New England Galaxy, but produced a 
public expression of dissent from lawyers . A year later the same 
defendant, in another trial, offered t o produce the truth in evidence. 
The judge reversed Quincy's ruling and adhered to the precedent of 
Commonwealth v. Clapp. The ruling was upheld on appeal to the 
21 Supreme Judicial Court. 
Defense lawyers contended fiercely for the admission of evidence 
to prove truth, and the higher courts reiterated the familiar doctrines. 
In Massachusetts, as in other states and in England, the courts long 
continued to maintain practical r estrictions on freedom of the press 
11 in the spirit of a system of law whic h recognized no affirmative right 
of freedom of discussion, but which sought primarily to preserve the 
peace and to protect the government and the reputation of individuals 
from injurious public criticism. II 2 2 
In t he 182 5 case of Commonwealth v. Blanding, the chief 
justice declared truth to be immaterial to the c haracter of a libel as 
a public offence. 23 He _said the public interest requires: 
That _men not invested with authority by the laws 
shall not usurp the power of public accusation, and 
arraign before the public with malicious motives 
t heir neighbors and fellow citizens, exposing them 
to partial trials in forms not warranted by the consti-
tution or the laws • . . The common law, therefore, 
is left unimpaired by the constitution, except as 
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the propagator of written or printed tales to the 
essential prejudice of anyone in his estate or 
reputation is a public offender, and is not allowed 
to excuse himself by the additional wrong of prov-
ing in a court of justice in a collateral way the 
facts which he has unwarrantably promulgated. 
The judge explained that the constitutional exceptions provided 
for related to proceedings of the legislature and courts, to complaints 
on the conduct of public officials, and discussions about elective 
officers as allowed by the doctrine of Commonwealth v. Clapp. 
In conclusion he said: 
That much decried rule that truth is no defense in 
a prosecution for libel .•. is founded in common 
sense and common justice and, indeed, the code 
of no civilized country would repudiate it ... A 
further relaxation would scarcely take place with-
out involving the community, families, and in-
dividuals in those contentions and acrimonious 
conflicts which will render the social state little, 
if at all, better than savage. 
Legislation for Truth 
Two years after the Blanding case, in 1827, the Massachusetts 
legislature passed a statute making truth a defense in all criminal 
libels when published with good motives and for just ends: 
Section I. Be it enacted by the Senate and House 
of Representatives in General Court assembled and 
by the authority of the same, That in every prosecu-
tion for writing and publishing any libel, it shall be 
lawful for any defendant upon trial of the cause to 
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give in evidence in his defense, the truth of 
the matter charged as libelous: Provided always 
that such evidence shall not be a justification, 
unless on the trial it shall be further made satis-
factorily to appear that the matter charged as libel -
ous was published with good motives and for j usti -
fiable ends . 
Section II. Be it further enacted, That in all actions 
of the case, for writing and publishing any libel, and 
in all actions for slander wherin the defendant or 
defendants plead the general issue, and also in justi-
fication that the words written and published and 
spoken were true, such plea in justification shall 
not be held or taken as evidence that the defendant 
or defendants wrote and published or spoke such 
words or made such c harge . Nor shall such plea of 
justification, if the defendant or defendants fail to 
establish it, be of itself proof of the malice of such 
words or charge, but the jury shall decide upon the 
whole case, law or usage to the contrary notwith -
standing. 2 5 
This legislative action marked the removal of the last sub-
stantial legal re_striction on freedom of the press in Massachusetts. 
Judicial opinion was conservative, however. The 182 6 law was in-
terpreted as simply enlarging the grounds of defense.· Attorneys for 
the defens~ for many years continued to make futile pleas that the 
constitution had abrogated the common law of libel . 2 6 
Subsequent legislation made the burden of proof on a defendant 
in a criminal libel case very much less. After 1855 the law provided 
that evidence of "the truth of the matter charged as libelous . ... shall 
be deemed a sufficient justification, unless malicious intention is 
proved." 27 
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CHAPTER V 
LIBEL AS A TORT 
Introduction 
Defamation as a tort is a civil injury for which the remedy is 
an action for damages. A tort is defined as violation of a private 
antecedent duty in rem; that is, a violation of the duty of everyone 
to respect the rights of others. In the case of defamation, this is 
l 
the duty to respect the right of others' reputations. 
Defamation has been generally defined as a statement which 
exposes an individual to "hatred, ridicule, or contempt, or which causes 
him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in 
his office, profession or trade. " Such a statement, if in writing, print-
ing, or other permanent form is a libel; if in spoken words or signifi-
cant gestures, a slander. 2 
A statement that is clearly defamatory on its face is considered 
to be libel per se. Libel per quod is libel which requires proof of 
special damages. However, a great deal of confusion exists regarding 
the exact differences. In some cases, words that are not libelous in 
themselves but only when special circumstances are shown may still 
be libelous without proof of special damages and, in that respect, 
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regarded as libel per se. For example to call a white man a Negro in 
most southern states would be libel per se because of the special 
circumstances in the status differentiation of the races. 
The general definitions of libel and slander as given by the 
courts of Massachusetts are in agreement with American jurisprudence 
in general. In the early case of Commonwealth v. Clapp 3 the court. 
said: 
A libel in its more restricted sense as committed 
against an individual is a malicious defamation I 
made public by either printing 1 writing 1 signs 1 or 
pictures tending either to blacken the memory of 
one who is dead 1 or the reputation of one who is 
living 1 and thereby to expose him to public hatred I 
contempt 1 _or ridicule. 
In 1942, a court stated: 4 
5 But: 
Any writing is a libel that discredits an individual 
in the minds of any considerable and respectable 
class in the community. 
Spoken words, in order to be actionable per se, 
should import in themselves a charge of some punish-
able offense, or an imputation of some disgraceful 
disease, or be spoken in relation to some trade or 
occupation in which the party is injured. 
Spoken words, then, are not actionable per se unless they 
charge crime, immorality, disease, or misconduct in office. In the 
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absence of such imputations, the plaintiff must prove special damages, 
that is, damages that are the natural and probable result of the slander. 
In libel, however, it is not necessary to prove special damages. 
Publications may be libelous that discredit the plaintiff in the minds of 
respectable people, taking into consideration the emotions, prejudices, 
and intolerances of mankind, in determining the ·effect of a publication 
on an individual's standing in the community. Publications that expose 
persons to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace 
are actionable, even though no crime is imputed and the words, if 
spoken, would not be actionable. 
Libel Per Se 
Words imputing falsehood, dishonesty, or fraud are actionable 
per se . Thus the following article which appeared in the Lowell Sunday 
Telegram was ruled libel per se. The article charged that the plaintiff, 
chairman of the board of police in Lowell, 
. . • could not select in the entire city a person 
who is better adapted for the purpose of robbing 
the taxpayers than "Bob" Crowley ••• The election 
of Crowley, as pointed out by the Telegram months 
ago, means the placing of additional power in the 
hands of the police-run combine, at the head of 
which stands Frank B. Dow. 6 
However, it has been held not libelous to state that a man 
holds seven offices. 7 
--·,===c==== ============= 
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An imputation of indebtedness is libelous per se. An advertise-
ment for a bank which ·appeared in the Needham Chronicle showed a 
picture of the plaintiff's house with the caption, "An important ques-
tion 'To rent or to own' - Change a house into a home by owning it -
we will help you decide now." The plaintiff's house was not mort-
gaged. The court declared that readers could infer that the bank had . 
foreclosed and was offering the house for sale. It was not necessary 
in this case to impute wrongdoing or bad character to the plaintiff. An 
alleged inability to meet his financial obligations could lower his 
esteem in the community . 8 
C harges of inebriety or mental derangement are libelous per 
se . It is libelous per se to falsely charge that a person has been 
arrested and imprisoned. 10 To print that one is guilty of the crimes 
of assault, burglary, robbery, larceny, and homicide is libelous 
per se·. 11 The following article appeared in the Boston Post under the 
headline, "Sues fGr $20,000 for an alleged assault." 
Adolph S. Lundin of this city is the defendant in a 
suit for $20,000 filed in the office of the clerk of 
the Superior Court by Helen Lund, also of Boston. 
The plaintiff alleges that on May 8 Lundin committed 
an assault upon her which resulted in wrenching her 
side, straining her back, and causing other injuries 
·which prevented her for a long time from attending 
to her usual duties. 
The court ruled that the article charged a criminal offence and 
I~ 
II 
l 
!t 
II 
" li 
'i 
I• 
I 
I !, 
I. 
't I, 
I, 
,. 
i: ,, 
" I' ,, 
j. 
'I 
,I 
,, 
'I !, 
1: 
I! 
II 
II 
'I !: 
I' d 
1: 
I 
.. 
oi 
1: 
I' ,I 
'I 
I 
54 
!I 
! 
'I 
I 
'I 55 p---lL--
'1 
-=-~--=:----::..:..:.--=-::c·.:::·=====-::;_ ---
- -- - =-=-=:o= 
I 
I 
I 
., 
I• 
l! 
I! 
II 
,! 
'I 
,, 
I' q 
I, I· 
I, 
II II 
I' ,,
!t 
!I 
II 
Jl 
:i 
ii 
II 
!' 
;! 
il 
I 
I, 
!! ,, 
J! 
I 
I 
I 
I' 
.I ,, 
jj 
li il 
!i 
1: 
,, 
II I 
li 
'I 
I• I! 
,• 
. ,. 
II 
was thus libelous on its face . The question of libel was not sub-
mitted to the jury; the court ruled this is necessary only when a libel 
is open to interpretation, or when the conduct charged may have been 
innoc ent or justifiable . The plaintiff was awarded $1500 . 12 
Charges of arson , conspiracy, or blac~ail are libelous. 13 
Charges of crimes against the government are actionable per se. 14 
The following article in the Boston Herald- Traveler was declared not 
libelous : 15 
"CLEAR IT WITH JIMMY" OR ELSE 
If you don't clear it with Jimmy, your chances of 
getting anything out of this administration in the 
line of patronage are not good. Jimmy is Governor 
Tobin's younger brother and according to all avail -
able reports, he rules the patronage with an iron 
hand, and if you weren't right in the election, your 
chances of getting a job can be discounted. 
· To charge a person with keeping a disorderly house, gambling, 
or drunkeness is actionable per se. 16 Imputations of perjury are 
17 
libelous per se . Charges of forgery and embezzlement are action-
able, but the epithets "cheat" and "swindler" are not actionable 
unless spoken of one in relation to his business. 18 
Imputations of immorality or sexual crimes are actionable per 
se. Words spoken of an unmarried woman charging her with fornica-
11 tion are actionable per se . It is libelous to charge a person with incest, 
rape, or pr~stitution . 19 
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Words imputing contagious or venereal disease are actionable 
per se . 20 But to state that a person is "now ill with disease" bears 
no cause for action . 2l 
A charge that a lawyer entertained "vile and disreputable women" 
in his office was held to be libelous. The court ruled the publication 
"tended to subject the plaintiff to public contempt and to injure not 
only his reputation for integrity and moral worth, but as a member of 
the bar entitled to the confidence of the community." 22 
To charge that a person is unfit for office or with misconduct 
23 
or crime in office is actionable. But a political advertisement 
urging the voters of the town of Westfield not to vote for the plaintiff 
was found not libelous. 24 
Libel Per Quod 
Words not generally ac:;tionable per se may become so when 
an act done by a person in office is punishable, or when the defama -
tion tends t o disgrac e or disparage one in an office of profit or honor. 
The following article c harging that a city tax collector was corrupt 
was found t o be libelous . 
TAX - TITLE SHARKS 
Working in combination with city officials, these 
"investors" make money by attending the so- called 
public sales which are conducted primarily for their 
benefit and buying interests in properties. 
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We are informed that those who have made a 
specialty of attending the tax-title sales as 
members of the inner circle have expected that 
this year's auction would be remarkably pro-
fitable for the combination that controls the 
sales and the purchases. Moreover 1 every year 
the sales are conducted primarily for the bene-
fit of the tax-title sharks and there is open 
collusion between the sellers and the sharks. 
The court held that 1 since the tax. collector of Boston was the 
only person authorized to conduct tax sales in Boston 1 the article 
plainly intimated that he was a dishonest and corrupt official; it was 1 
therefore 1 llbelous . 2 5 
Cartoons 1 Photographs 1 Motion Pictures 
Libels can take the form of cartoons 1 photographs 1 motion 
pictures 1 etc . A photograph of a respectable actress displayed at a 
burlesque theater was declared to be a libel. A sign outside the theater 
announced "Minsky's Midsummer Follies" and included a picture of the 
plaintiff (fully dressed) among a group of pictures of scantily clad 
women described as "Oriental Beauties." The plaintiff was a respec-
table dramatic actress; she was not employed at burlesques and was 
not acting at the defendant's theater. The court found that the photo -
graph exposed the plaintiff to ridicule and contempt 1 as a woman 1 and 
26 
tended to injure in her profession as an actress. 
A motion picture is a libel and invades the privacy of persons 
who may be identified with characters in the picture 1 and whose lives 
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are so represented as to discredit them in the community. 2 7 
A political cartoon which appeared in a Lowell newspaper was 
declared to be a libel in 1911 . The full page cartoon concerned the 
mayor of that city I who was up for re - election . The cartoon 1 entitled 
"City Farm~' showed a group of people in dejection and despair being 
served a tray of "Poor food 1 rancid butter 1 and 'shadow' tea." Above· 
the cartoon appeared the words 1 "Saving on the city's poor is the 
meanest kind of economy - it is no crime to be poor 1 but it is wrong 
to stint the poor and unfortunate." In large type below the cartoon 
appeared the following paragraph: 
Mayor Brown forced a competent and humane board 
of charity out of office because it would not do his 
bidding 1 and he put in the present charity board I 
which has been cognizant of this outrage upon the 
poor and unfortunate inmates of our city farm. In 
the name of humanity and public decency 1 let us 
go the the polls tomorrow like men 1 and repudiate 
the mayor who has been solely responsible for this 
blot upon the fair name of our city. 2 8 
Radio and Television 
The question of defamation by radio or television is a con-
fusing one; statutory law and judicial precedents in the several states 
are conflicting. Traditionally 1 defamation via the spoken word is 
construed as slander on the basis that such verbal defamation is cur-
sory and impermanent. With the advent of the mass communications 
media of radio and television I such defamation could easily be more 
==-~------==- --=__::.-. ~ ·~----~---- - -·-' 
' I 
!i 
lJ 
I 
., 
! 
., 
1, I, 
tl 
I 
'• 
I 
I' ,, 
,, 
'I 
,, 
l 
'I 
'I ., 
!' ,, 
I, 
'• 
I 
ii 
'I 
I 
I 
II 
58 
' 
' 
-- -- .:...-=---=----
damaging than the printed word. 
Three states have enacted statutes specifying that defamation 
by radio is slander . The general inclination is to regard radio defama -
tion as libel , and Oregon and Washington enacted statutes to this 
effect as early as the 1930's. The Massachusetts statute regarding 
radio and television defamation would indicate that actions for 
either libel or slander could ensue from such defamation. 
An important factor here concerns the liability of a broadcast -
ing company for defamatory s tatements over which it has no control. 
The Federal Communications Act of 1934 prohibits broadcasting 
stations from censuring political opinion. Courts have also recog-
nized that a station has no control over ad libs of a defamatory 
nature . 
The Judicial Council of Massachusetts recommended, in a 
1942 report, that there be enacted a specific law regarding defamation 
in radio or television broadcasts. Such a law was passed in 1957, 
h . h 29 w 1c states: 
The owner, operator, or licensee of a radio or 
television station or network of such stations, or 
the agent or servant of any such person shall not 
in an action for slander or for publishing a libel 
be held liable in damages for or on account of any 
defamatory matter uttered, broadcast, telecast, or 
published over the radio or television facilities o:= 
any such station or network by any person whose 
utterance, broadcast, telecast, or publication is 
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1 
under the provision of any law of the United 
States or any regulation 1 ruling 1 or order of the 
Federal Communications Commission 1 subject 
to censorship of control by such station or net -
work . 
Added St. 1957 1 c. 378 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE DEFENSE OF TRUTH 
Introduction 
Under present Massachusetts statutory law, truth is a justi-
fication for libel in the absence of actual malice. 
The defendant in an action for writing or pub-
lishing a libel may introduce in evidence the 
truth of the matter contained in the publication 
charged as libelous, and the truth shall be a 
justification unle~s actual malice is proved. 1 
In several other states, as well as in England, truth is a 
defense, subject to similar qualifications. Truth published with 
good motives for a justifiable purpose, in the absence of malice, is 
a defense to civil libel in Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Truth alone is a defense in civil libel 
in most other states. 
2 Truth is a complete defense to slander in Massachusetts. 
Truth is a defense to libel only in the absence of malice, 
But if the publication was for a justifiable purpose 
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such as pleadings, or other judicial proceeding s 
or petitions for the removal of officers or criti-
cisms of public officials or Inftters of common 
interest, truth is a defense. 
One is, therefore, not always justified in publishing the truth . 
The fact that a man owes money does not excuse his creditors for 
publishing a black list containing his name . 4 
The Extent of Truth 
5 
The truth must extend to all aspects of the libel, and the 
6 facts must meet the charge. That is, in a libel involving several 
7 
charges, the truth of all the charges must be established. Proof 
that a woman committed adultery was ruled no justification for calling 
her a 11 dirty old whore. 11 8 
Proof of a similar crime is not admissible in evidence. Thus, 
a defendant could not justify his charg e that a man committed sodomy 
with a mare by proving he committed sodomy with a cow. 9 
It is not necessary, however, to prove each minute detail of 
a publication. It is sufficient to prove the charge is substantially 
10 true. 
It is not enough to believe a defamatory statement is true; it 
must , in fact, be proven true. That a woman's behaviour led the 
defendant to believe she was immoral did not justify a charge of un-
11 
chastity . A charge of larceny was not justified by the fact that 
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the person so charged actually took the defendant's property in jest, 
causing him to believe he had stolen it. 12 
i. Massachusetts holdings that mere belief in the truth of a 
il 
11 defamatory statement is no justification are in agreement with American 
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:, jurisprudence in general, and with the authoritative California case of 
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Wilson v. Fitch (41 Cal 363, 1871) in particular, in which the court 
declared: 13 
Malice 
In order to justify a publication purporting to be 
made on belief of the author that the fact was 
true, the defendant must prove the truth of the 
fact, and not merely that he believed it to be 
true. 
The presence of actual malice, that is, malicious intention, 
negates the justification of truth. This "malice in fact" is distin-
guished from "malice in law" which arises from the publication of a 
libel. In 1890, a Massachusetts court stated: 14 
Malice cannot be implied from the publication, 
but malicious intention at the time to injure the 
individual must be proved. 
The deliberate publication of a libel when the publisher knows 
it to be false, or has no reason to believe it true, is conclusive 
evidence of malice. 15 False and injurious statements are considered 
malicious unless fairly made by a person "in the discharge of some 
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public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in conduct of his 
affairs in matters where his interest is concerned. " 16 
This view was upheld in a later case in which the court held 
that, while the law infers malicious intention from the publication of 
words actionable per se, this inference "may be rebutted when cir-
cumstances exclude the idea of malice and it is shown the words were 
spokez;1 in good faith." 17 
Evidence of malice will serve to enhance the damages; the 
absence of malice will mitigate damages. 
In early Massachusetts cases, the failure to prove a defense 
of truth was regarded as proof of malice . A statute passed in 1826 
provided that such a failure to establish truth was not proof of malice, 
"but the jury shall decide upon the whole case whether such spoken 
plea was or was not made with malicious intent." 18 
The Conroy Reversal 
In proving malice on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff is 
limited to publications in the declaration. Evidence of malice other 
than that declared on is not admissible. This point was well founded 
in the common law in Massachusetts when courts between 1825 and 1915 
consistantly refused to admit in evidence of malice statements made 
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by the defendant upon other occasions, where these were not substan- 1: 
tially the same in import. 19 This precedent, however, was reversed 
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in the case of Conroy v. Fall 'River Herald 20 when the court ad -
,: mitted in evidence of malice proof of additional and dissimilar publica--
11 I 
i: tions . The 1942 report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts ex-
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pressed serious disagreement with the Conroy decision. The Council 
regarded it a s contrary to the laws of evidence, in the introduction of 
II 
I 
a surprise element, and confusing to juries. The Council's recommencia- 1 
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tion for change in the existent s tatute was passed in 1943: 21 
If the defendant in an action for slander or for 
publishing a libel justifies that the words spoken 
or published were true, such allegation, although 
not maintained by the evidence, shall not of it -
self be proof of the malice alleged in the declara -
tion , nor shall statements of the defendant dif-
fering in import from those declared on be ad -
missible to establish his malice unless such 
statements were published in pursuance of a gener-
al scheme to defame or otherwise injure the plain -
tiff. If the plaintif_f proposes to introduce evidence 
of statements of the defendant other than those de-
clared on he shall give the defendant written notice 
of such intention, s pecifying the date and content 
of such statements, at least 14 days before trial 
begins, or earlier if the court so orders; and if any 
such statement is introduced in evidenc e, the de -
fendant shall be permitted to prove that it was true, 
or was privileged , or any other facts relating there-
to which tend to negative malice. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE DEFENSE OF PRIVILEGE 
Introduction 
Defamatory statements made by certain persons under specific 
conditions are accorded an absolute or qualified privilege . Absolute 
privilege is the legal immunity granted to senators and representatives 
for statements made during the legislative session, to judges, counsel, 
and witnesses for statements made pertinent to and in the course of 
judicial proceedings, and for statements in official government publi-
cations. Newspapers are accorded a qualified privilege in publishing 
fair and accurate reports of such proceedings. 
Absolute Privilege 
The United States Constitution provides that for "any speech 
or debate in either House they [congressmen ) shall not be questioned 
1 in any other place ." This provision extends to committee reports, 
votes, resolutions, and to any matters connected with legislative 
sessions. Such privilege enables congressmen to perform their duties 
,; without fear of prosecution. The immunity does not extend, however, 
1: 
I 
to unofficial communications or to those made outside the confines 
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of the Houses. 
Most states have similar constitutional or statutory provisions, 
patterned after the U . S . Constitution, which grq.nt absolute immunity 
to a legislator for his remarks made in the course of a legislative 
session . Article XXI of the Massachusetts Constitution states: 
The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate 1 
in either House of the legislature/ is so essential 
to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the 
foundation of any a c cusation or prosecution I ac-
tion or c omplaint in any other court or place what -
soever. 
Thus, members of the Massachusetts legislature are not 
liable for words spoken in discussion of official duties. Absolute 
privilege , however, does not extend to words spoken unofficially 1 
even though spoken in the legislative hall while the legislature is in 
1: 
i; session. 2 
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A witness before a legislative committee is absolutely privileged. 3 
The same privilege is extended to judicial proceedings 1 where words 1 
even those which impute crime and, if spoken elsewhere would be 
actionable per se, are not actionable if they are applicable and per-
tinent to the case . The question is not whether the words are true, 
but whether they are spoken in the course of judicial proceedings and 
are pertinent or relevant to the cause. There is, however 1 a limit a -
tion on absolute privilege in judicial proceedings. A party or counsel 
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may not take advantage of the privileged occasion to gratify his 
private malice by slanderous statements that have no bearing on the 
4 
case . 
A criminal complaint made to a court of competent jurisdiction 
and containing no impertinent allegations is not actionable as libel. 5 
A complaint to a grand jury is not libelous, even though it charges 
perjury . 6 
However I defamatory statements contained in a declaration in 
an action signed by counsel are not privileged where they are not 
pertinent or material to the is sue. In a suit for libel against a lawyer 
who had signed such an action 1 the court found no justification on the 
grounds of privilege . The lawyer was not allowed to show he believed 
the statements to be true, his sources of information, nor instruc-
tions from his client. 7 
A witness is not liable for statements made in an affidavit, 
however. 8 
Absolute privilege may also extend to official actions, reports, 
and records. A selectman at a town meeting accused a citizen of 
n voting twice o In the ensuing suit 1 the court held that the charge was 
! 
II ! made in discharge of an official duty and therefore, in the absence 
' L of malice, not actionable . 9 But a voter who falsely accused a town 
' 
' ! 
clerk of destroying a vote was held liable. 10 
An official report of the condition of a town's schools was 
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ruled not libelous where it did not impute corrupt motives. 11 A 
member of the Massachusetts Medical Society was privileged in pub-
•1 lishing a true account of the expulsion of another member and suits ,, 
! 
i1 brought by the latter against the society . .1 2 Finally, statements made 
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to a police officer to aid in detecting a criminal are privileged. 13 
Qualified Privilege 
In Massachusetts, as elsewhere, qualified privilege is ex-
tended to fair and accurate reports of legislative, judicial, and other 
official proceedings published in good faith. The courts of the Common-
wealth, however, have held that the general right of inspection of 
public records does not entitle a newspaper in every instance to pub-
lish such records without regard to the truth of defamatory matter 
contained therein. 14 
Nor does privilege extend to reports of a stockholders meeting 
of a private corporation. The following statement, published in the 
Boston Post, was held to be not privileged: 15 
At the office of C. Henry Kimball, 97 Haverhill 
Street, officers, stockholders, and lawyers in-
terested in the Burrows Lighting & Heating Com-
pany met this morning. The affairs of the Burrows 
-Lighting & Heating Company have been before the 
public for a considerable time and are apparently 
in a badly tangled condition. An order of notice 
was recently issued by the Superior Court against 
C. Henry Kimball, William Galletly, and the 
Burrows Lighting & Heating Company, ordering 
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them to appear in court on Thursday of this week 
to show cause why they should not be restrained 
from holding any meeting. The charges were that 
the holders of a majority of the capital stock of 
the company had fraudulently secured control over 
416 1 000 shares of stock. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that this 
meeting involved no public concern. Although the meeting was a 
privileged occasion for those involved on the basis of common interest 1 
no immunity could extend to the newspaper report. 
An accusation of crime not made to a judge in the course of 
judicial proceedings is not privileged. 16 
In 1952 the Hearst Corporation was held not privileged in the 
publication of a libelous article based on information gleaned from 
The Stars & Stripes. The court ruled the maga zine was not an official 
government communication and 1 therefore 1 not within the realm of 
privilege. 17 
In 1856 a Massachusetts court rejected the old English rule 
that proceedings must be directly judicial or held in a court of justice 1 
and reports made only upon the conclusion of a trial to carry the pro-
tection of privilege. The court declared that the English rule "is not 
adopted in Massachusetts 1 but the publication of proceedings before 
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all public bodies for the necessary information of the people is allowed. " 18 
The Law of Libel Amendment Act 19 allowed the English press 
to publish reports contemporaneously with judicial proceedings I and 
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extended the privilege to reports of proceedings of any public meetings, 
that is , "any meetings bona fide and lawfully held for a lawful 
purpose, and for the furtherance oC or discussion of, any matter of 
public c oncern , whether admission thereto be general or restricted. " 
The privilege attached to reporting public meetings is more restric-
': tive than that accorded judicial proceedings. Limitations imposed on. 
the former rule out publication of obscene or blasphemous matter and 
privilege is negated by malice~ 
I, In commenting on the foregoing British rule, one leading author-
ity states that "in the United States, on the contrary, public meet-
ings are not even given the protection of qualified privilege 0" 20 He 
cites a Michigan case 21 for proof, but gives no cognizance to the 
Massachusetts case of Barrows v . Bell, cited above, in which the 
courts clearly rec ognized reports of all public meetings as privileged. 
· Newspaper reports of grand jury investigations are qualifiedly 
privileged. Such reports, however , carry the protection of privilege 
only where they are fair, impartial, and accurate. Thus, in a 1913 
case against the Boston Post, the court found for the plaintifC whose 
1
• name was erroneously included in a list of persons indicted by the 
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grand jury . 22 
In a similar case, the New York World included an innocent 
man's name in its list of "draft dodgers." The World claimed absolute 
privilege on the grounds that the War Department issued the list and 
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requested its publication . The paper 1 they argued 1 was performing 
a public duty and wa s 1 therefore, entitled to the same privilege as 
the government . The decision of the lower court for the defendant 
wa s reversed on the grounds that the privilege 1 if any, was not ab -
solute, but qualified 1 and no justification existed for publishing false 
information . 2 3 
A Boston Post reporter brought suits against two other Boston 
newspapers for stories of his arrest for larceny on a fugitive from 
jus tice warrant . In :the case against the Boston Globe 1 the court ruled 
that a newspaper may publish the fact of arrest upon a specific charge 
regardless of the truth of the charge. 24 The Boston Traveler was 
also successful in proving the defense of privilege . The Traveler's 
story ran as follows: 
Fred H. Thompson 1 a Boston Post reporter 1 of 150 
Pleasant Street, Newton Centre 1 and William E. 
Callahan 1 watchman of the Rumford Press 1 Concord, 
N . H. , were arrested today in connection with the 
larceny of copies of the Atlantic Monthly containing 
Gov. AI Smith's article on Catholicism. Thompson 
wa s arrested by Inspector B. J. Goode of the Newton 
police on a fugitive from justice warrant. Callahan 
was arrested at Concord and charged with larceny . 
The warrant for Thompson was issued today in the 
Newton district court at the request of J. E . Siova I 
chief of police of Concord, N. H . 1 and Herbert W. 
Raine, solicitor of Merrimac county 1 N.H. The 
specific charges in the warrant alleged that Thompson 
procured the commission of larceny by Callahan of 
eight printed pages, for which he gave Callahan 
$600. Thompson was bailed by David P. Shea in 
$1000 1 for hearing tomorrow. 
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The court found the warrant , bearing the seal of the court and 
the teste of the judge, to be within the realm of judicial proceedings . 
The Traveler's statement that the reporter had been arrested on the 
warrant was true and the charge of larceny was included in the com-
plaint. Therefore, no damages could be awarded. 2 5 
The right to report court proceedings does not extend to 
reporti ng accusations contained in papers filed in a court and not yet 
:: brought before a judge or magistrate for official action. 26 
\1 
•' 
' l' 
t' 
Massachusetts follows the majority rule that reports of plead-
ings filed before the opening of a case are not privileged. Although 
parties in an action are privileged in any charges made in such affada-
vits and pleadings since these are addressed to the court, newspaper 
publication of these prior to judicial action may result in needless 
spreading of the charges. 
A Kentucky court, however, has ruled that privilege can apply 
prior to a judicial hearing. In this case (Beiser v. Scripps McRea 
Publishing Co., 113 Ky 383, 1902), the court considered the mere 
application for a warrant of arrest not a "private or confidential 
communication [but] the first step in a criminal proceeding . " 2 7 
' :: New York also accepted this minority rule in Campbell v. New, York 
j' 
EveningPost (245N.Y. 320, 1927). Thecourtstated, "Thefiling 
1
. of a pleading is a public and official act in the course of judicial 
1 proceedings." 28 
-:..:-=::=..=--=---::..=.._=-=::::-:-_;:;...=::.:::= ---=---.- -.......=...-. -:- =--===-·=· ··- -==-~.:-::. ;_ ~-.;::-----=---:_.--=--~-::-. :::~..:--- -
I 
I· 
I 
I 
L 
'· 
I! 
It 
., 
I 
II 
76 
! 
I 
II 
d 
II 
I! i; 
I, 
ji 
i q 
:1 ,, 
I ,, 
Executive and legislative proceedings and investigations also 
extend qualified privilege to fair and accurate reports. In a case 
against the Stand9-rd Publishing Company 1 the court ruled a story 
based on a fire marshal's records and an earlier court proceeding to 
be privileged. Although the newspaper report did contain a charge 
of arson I it_ was a fair and accurate account of an official investiga -
tion. The court found for the defE;mdant newspaper on the grounds 
" that both the findings of the fire marshal and the proceedings of the 
i 
;: 
l 
' 
municipal court were privileged. 29 
Defamatory statements in an official report of an invest_igating 
committee are not actionable. 30 However 1 statements made before 
a congressional committee are not privileged as reports of a public 
proceeding 1 even though the committee meeting was referred to and 
discussed . 31 
·A qualified privilege may apply to reports of other than judicial 
or legislative proceedings, and newspapers may publish a fair report 
I• 
I of proceedings before an ecclesiastical tribunal. However 1 if the 
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report contains defamatory statements and does not purport to be a 
full report of the proceedings 1 a defense of privilege cannot stand. 32 
A newspaper is not privileged in reporting the contents of a 
l. petition for the disbarment of an attorney filed in vaca and not pre-
,, 
33 
sented or docketed. 
A labor union president who also served as editor of the official 
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union magazine enjoyed a conditional privilege in reporting the minutes 
of the union's executive board meeting. The following story was the 
subject of the suit: 
In the case of Charles L.Sheehan and Joseph 
M. D'Ambrosio, charges have been preferred 
against these two men by certain officers of 
the local union, and counter charges filed by 
Sheehan against all of the officers of the local 
union. The charges against these two men were 
based on the fact that they entered the office of 
Local No. 25 and brutally assaulted one of the 
business agents, Francis J. Halloran, a man 
old enough to be their father. They in turn 
preferred charges against the officers of the 
local . 
The defense set up truth, lack of malice, and privilege in 
defense . The jury returned for the plaintiff. The court ruled a defense 
of privilege is forfeited when a- publisher of defamatory material lacks 
grounds for belief in the truth, or he publishes such material for a 
purpose other than that for which the privilege is given, or makes pub-
lication to a person unnecessary for the purpose, or he includes 
material not necessary to the privileged occasion. 34 
Statements made in the discharge of a duty to the public may 
be conditionally privileged. Thus, in a case against a telegraph 
company, the court ruled that the immunity of such a company from 
liability in transmitting a libelous message must be broad ~nough to 
enable the company to render public service efficiently and quickly. 3 5 
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Defamatory statements, if made in good faith to detect a 
criminal and bring him to justice, are privileged. 36 
Under Massachusetts law, a doctor is privileged in reporting 
to interested parties that a person has a venereal disease: 
Any registered physician or surgeon who knows 
or has reason to believe that any person is in-
fected with gonorrhea or syphilis may disclose 
such information to any person from whom the 
infected person has received a promise of 
marriage or to the parent or guardian of such 
person if a minor . Such information given in 
good faith by a registered physician or s~rgeon 
shall not constitute a slander or libel. 3 
Statements made in discharge of a duty between certain persons 
may be conditionally privileged . Thus, a letter to a father-in - law 
in answer to his request for information about his son- in-law's 
social standing is privileged, if fairly made . 3S But, a defamatory 
letter to a man about debts his wife contracted while single is not 
. '1 d 39 pnv1 ege . 
I, 
I 
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Statements about the character of a suitor or lover are privileged. 40 
Statements about the character of an employee and reports of 
mercantile standing are held privileged. 4l 
An occasion may be privileged where the publisher and the 
recipient have a common interest and the communication is of a kind 
reasonably calculated to protect or further it . 42 In this vein, 
79 
" Massachusetts courts have recognized a privilege attaching to a 
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common business interest 43 and common membership in a church. 44 
The proceedings of a church are quasi-judicial 
and those who compose, give testimony 1 act 
and vote I pronounce the result orally or in writ -
ing acting in good faith and within the scope of 
the authority conferred by this limited jurisdic-
tion and not falsely or colorably making such 
proceedings a pretense for an intended scandal 
are protected by law . 
Statements made in self- defense are privileged . Thus 1 the 
owner of a building was privileged in cautioning his employees against 
a person as an inc endiary . If made in good faith 1 such communication 
is privileged, even though it may contain an unfounded criminal 
charge . 45 
The defendant in an action for slander is privileged in defama -
tory comments made for the purpose of protecting his own interests 
in the case at hand 1 and in the belief that such comments are true. 
The plaint iff must show malice in fact in order to recover. 46 
A libel made in self- defense may not be privileged unless it 
clearly appears such an attack is necessary for the attacker's justi-
fication . One may in self- defense brand the accusation of another 
of self- defense must not be exceeded. 47 
Privilege may also apply to comments made at the request or 
80 
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provocation of the accus e d . 48 
i 
I j: Good Faith 
I. 
In commenting on the exercise of privilege, Massachusetts 
courts have repeatedly emphasized the necessity of good faith and 
the absence of malice . In the very early case of Coffin v. Coffin, 
:· the court declared that it was a sufficient defense that the defamatory 
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words were spoken on a privileged occasion "for a justifiable purpose, 
not maliciously, nor with a design to defame, even though the words 
themselves are untrue." 49 
In C hristopher v. Akin , the court pointed out that privilege 
depends "not so much on the manner or form of the imputation 
[ of crime] but the oc<?asion or circumstance, and whether it is made 
in good faith by a person immediately interested to protect his own 
interest, and without a malicious motive." 50 
Defamatory words spoken i n the performance of an official 
duty are not privileged where express malice is found. 51 An 
accusation made to a police officer wantonly and maliciously is not 
. '1 d 52 pnv1 ege • 
In Whitcomb v. Hearst Corporation, a newspaper article which 
went far beyond the facts contained in an alleged official communica-
tion was declared not privileged. The court upheld the view that 
privilege in reporting judicial proceedings is conditional on a fair 
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and accurate report; the publication in question had exceeded this 
privilege 0 53 
In an 1824 case, the court had this to say about exceeding 
privilege: 54 
If a person, under the pretense of a public 
proceeding or an official investigation into 
his conduct, traduce and vilify the character 
of a witness by unfounded statements or 
erroneous constructions, it is libelous and 
actionable. 
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CHAPTER VIII I 
1, 
FAIR COMMENT 
Introdtlction 
The right to comment on matters of public concern is well 
founded in English precedent, the United States Constitution 1 
state constitutions, and American common law practice. A defense 
of fair comment and criticism is different from that of justification 
by truth. In fair comment, it is necessary to establish only the basic 
facts upon which the comment is based. The comment must be fair 
and in the public interest. This differs from the defense of privilege 
in that such commentary is open to all on any occasion of public 
interest. Privilege is restricted to certain persons upon specific 
occasions. 1 In privilege, defamation may be excused by the occasion; 
in fair comment, there is no defamation where comment and criticism 
are directed at the plaintiff's work, and not his character. When such 
criticism becomes an attack on a man's private character 1 malice is 
involved and the criticism becomes libelous. 2 
Public Affairs and News 
A public speaker or writer may comment on public affairs. 3 
" 
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A newspaper may lawfully make fair comments on the conduct of pri -
vate persons affecting the administration of an institution. Thus, . 
the Boston Daily Advertiser published the following story regarding the 
administration of the New York custom house. 4 
A PIAG UE SPOT 
It is surprising how the New York press has 
rallied unitedly about the frauds which, at that 
custom house 1 cheat the government out of from 
ten million dollars to thirty million dollars annual -
ly. It is not surprising in the Evening Post , whose 
close relation with the Burts is understood. One 
Burt is the broker of the Havermeyer sugar people 
and boasts that he makes more than fifty thousand 
dollars a year in that interest by his influence in 
securing re - appraisals in the valuations of sugar 
imported by that great house. The other is Naval 
Officer of that port, and his long-time connection 
with some of the most disreputable elements in 
the New York custom house has been a matter of 
public knowledge ... The system of frauds has 
gone so far that claims for damage allowances -
that reductions in duty for damage suffered by 
goods in transit - have been all made and ready 
before the vessel arrived in port ••• 
Massachusetts courts have consistently ruled that the right 
of fair comment does not extend to false statements of fact. In the 
5 
case of Hubbard v. Allyn, the court declared: 
While ridicule 1 sarcasm, and invective may be 
employed in the discussion of matters of public 
interest if based on fact, a person charged with 
libel may not make false statements of fact with 
reference to the conduct of another because the 
subject matter is in the public interest. 
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The defendant in this case had published a story accusing a local 
baker of using adulterated vanilla in his products. The story stated: 
Pure vanilla wholesales at about $12 per gallon. 
What can one expect for $2. 7 5? He who buys 
at this price is either criminally stupid or 
deliberately dishonest . 
The plaintiff was able to prove he had paid $4 1 not $2. 7 5 per gallon 
for the vanilla. The court ruled that the story was based on a false 
statement of fact and 1 therefore 1 not a fair comment. 
In Swan v. Tappan 6 the defendant published a letter he re-
ceived from the Worcester School Committee regarding the plaintiff's 
text books: 
In reply to your letter respecting the use of 
reading books in our schools 1 the following 
statements will be sufficient. About two years 
ago 1 Swan's books we-r:e introduced into our 
schools. Very soon some of the teachers became 
dissatisfied with the books. The subject was 
brought up in the meetings of the board 1 and after 
discussion 1 committied. The report of the com-
mittee was in favor of introducing Mr. William 
Russell's books in all the schools 1 excepting 
the infant and lowest class in the primary school. 
The decision of the board was nearly unanimous 
in favor of the report and we do not think it would 
be possible to get a vote here to introduce Swan's 
readers again. They may perhaps be continued 
in the lowest classes; but in the higher grades 1 
Russell's are used 1 and also in the English and 
Classical High Schools. The action of our board 
is the best commendation that can come from this 
place in relation to the books. 
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The judge ruled that if any one of the material statements was found 
to be false I the publication was in law malicious and 1 therefore 1 
not a fair comment. 
The following story, based on a false statement of fact, was 
declared not to be a fair comment in 1879. 7 
A. S. Haynes, a prominent citizen and town clerk 
of Bolton, it is believed, has fallen under the sus-
picion of the officers of the law and , rightly or 
wrongly 1 the evide_nce will tend toward his possible 
connection with Mr . Cohen's death. It is hardly 
probable that the government can go so far as to 
establish any actual guilt of this person so far as 
the alleged murder is concerned, but it is said that 
it will be shown that at least one man existed with 
a motive for the crime 1 whether or not he committed 
it. 
A second article stated: 
A rumor that Mr . Haynes had confessed to the 
murder of Cohen was given considerable credence 
in town today, but lacks confirmation. 
Massachusetts courts, in refusing to grant a defense of fair 
comment to false statements of fact 1 are in agreement with the majority 
rule in the United States. In certain other states, the liberal ruling is 
applied that fair co mment extends to statements honestly made and 
based upon probable cause. In Pennsylvania I Kansas, and New York 1 
it has been held that public persons are amenable to public comment 
without liability 1 regardless of the strict truth of statements made. 
--- --= -=--~------ - -·- -· -=-- - ~-
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In a New York Case (Tanzer v. Crowley Publishing Corp., 268 NYS 
220, 1934) the court stated that a person holding public office must 
expect criticism, even though such is lacking in factual basis . 8 
The Ma ssachusetts courts uphold the right to comment on 
the character and conduct of public officials and candidates for public 
office. Statements and inferences must be based on reasonable 
grounds and not be a ctuated by express malice. In the case of 
Bodwell v. Osgood 9 the defendant wrote a letter to the Methuen 
school committee obj ecting to the appointment of the plaintiff as a 
school teacher in that town. The letter accused her of want of 
chastity, and pledged to prove the truth of the charge. The court 
found the letter to be a deliberate publication of a falsehood and 
therefore malicious. The plaintiff wa s awarded $1400 in damages. 
In Commonwealth v. Clapp 10 the court said: 
V\Then any man shall consent to be a candidate 
for a public office conferred by the election of 
the people, he must be considered as putting 
his character in is sue, so far as it may re -
spect his fitness and qualifications for office. 
On the other hand, the courts of the Commonwealth have point -
ed out that: 
Conductors of the public press are not privileged 
as such in the dissemination of news but are 
liable for libelous publications like other per-
sons, without proof of express malice. 11 
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In the case of Sheckell v. Jackson 12 a man was c harg e d 
with treachery and bad faith in regard to money he received to ob-
tain manumission of a fugitive slave. According to the accusation, 
he then invited the slave to go into a slave district for the purpose 
of enslaving him again. The defendant was not allowed to show what 
inquiries and examinations he had made and what sources of infor-
i! mation he had applied to before making the communications, nor was 
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he allowed to prove the existence of a general anxiety in the community 
that the slave had been deceived. In ruling the publication not a 
fair comment, the court said: 
On the part of the defendant, it is maintained 
that when a party has a duty to perform, and in 
the performance of that duty states honestly 
what he believes to be true, the occasion fur-
nishes a justification for the statement, though 
he may be mistaken •.. It is true there is such 
a class of cases .•• But in point of law, the 
occasion of this publication was not such an 
[ sic] one as affords a justification to the defen -
dant for publishing what was not true. 
In Massachusetts, newspapers as such have no special 
privileges : 
Publishers of newspapers have no greater right 
to give currency to libelous charges against a 
person than others. 13 
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Public Offering s 
Paintings, sculptures, music, plays , books 1 magazine 
articles - any work offered to the public may be commented upon 1 
severely criticized and even ridiculed, provided such criticism is 
factual and non- malicious. 
In an editorial published by the Boston Herald-Traveler, a 
tl 
Columbia professor was severely criticized for his activities in a Second 
World War peace movement o The editorial called the movement (Peace 
Now) "a sect of sanctimonious theopathetics" and referred to the 
plaintiff as "a befogged professor . " In ruling for the defendant, the 
court said that fair comment on matters of public concern may be severe 
and include ridicule, sarcasm, and invective, and that severity and 
vigor of expression were not to be confused with malice and motive. 
The editorial was found to be free of malice and within the rights of 
. 14 
fair comment. 
Other states have also ruled that the most extreme ridicule and 
criticism may still be within the bounds of fair comment. This is 
best exemplified by the celeprated Iowa case, Cherry v. Des Moines 
Leader, in which the newspaper's scathing commentary on a theatrical 
performance was found to be based on fact and not actuated by malice, 
and therefore not libelous. 15 
A trade libel suit was brought against the Boston Herald-Traveler 
:.-...:::::=.:-... :.=-- -· 
for the _ following_ story: 
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The sale of the Cardiff Giant, so called, at New 
Orleans, for the small price of eight dollars re-
calls the balmy days of that ingenious humbug. 
We well remember the learned remarks made by 
the connoisseurs in this city when it was exhibited 
in a vacant store quite near our office. While the 
vulgar herd only looked on in silence, seeing a 
colossal figure which excited their curiosity, but 
which they did not attempt to explain, the Harvard 
professors and other learned men traced its pedigree 
by their knowledge of artistic history, and con-
structed theories as to its origin, which at once 
displayed their erudition, and helped to advertise 
the show. But our professors and learned men were 
not the only victims of the sell. 
A distinguished professor of Yale discussed learned-
ly upon it in the Galaxy Magazine. He demonstrated 
beyond a doubt that the statue was authentic, that 
it was antique, and that it was a colossal monolith. 
He ciphered it down that it was a Phoenician image 
of the god Baal, and found no difficulty in proving 
to his own satisfaction that it was brought to 
America by a Phoenician party of adventurers who 
sailed in one of the ships of Tar shish, and that it 
was buried by the idolaters to save it from desecra -
tion by the hordes of savages who overpowered and 
destroyed the Phoenicians. He accounted for several 
marks and symbols upon the image, which were un-
mistakably Phoenician. Not long afterwards, the man 
who brought the colossal monolith to light confessed 
that it was a fraud and the learned gentlemen, who 
had indorsed its authenticity, were left as naked as 
the statue itself. 
The lower court found for the defendant on the grounds that 
no malice was intended. The plaintiff argued that the report contained 
factual inaccuracies; the Cardiff Giant had never been in New Orleans 
and had never been sold for $8. The story had prevented the sale of 
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the statue for $30 1 000. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
overruled the lower court decision and found for the plaintiff. The 
higher court foung the publication to be malicious in the flagrant 
disregard for the truth and possible consequences 1 regardless of the 
intent of the publisher . 16 
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1! RETRACTION AND MITIGATION OF DAMAGES 
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An apology and full retraction of a libelous article will 
generally serve to mitigate damages. In Massachusetts, the defendant 
must notify the plaintiff in writing of his intention to publish a re-
traction , along with a copy of the retraction. He is allowed to prove 
publication of such a retraction in mitigation of damages. If his offer 
is refused, he may prove this in mitigation. If he further proves good 
faith and the absence of malice, he will be responsible for only the 
actual damages sustained. Punitive damages are never allowed in the 
Commonwealth; proof of malice will not enhance the general damages. 
Legislation 
The Massachusetts retraction law , as amended in 1943 states: 
lj 
I! Where the defendant in an action for libel, at any 
'I time after the publication of the libel hereinafter I, 
'I referred to, either before or after such action is 
!, brought, but before the answer is required to be 
filed therein, gives written notice to the plaintiff 
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!,!II or to his attorney of his intention to publish a re-
traction of the libel, accompanied bi a copy of the 
I retraction which he intends to publish, and the 11 I !j 
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retraction is published 1 he may prove such publi-
cation and 1 if the plaintiff does not accept the 
offer of retraction 1 the defendant may prove such 
non- acceptance in mitigation of damages . If with-
in a reasonable time after receiving notice in writ-
ing from the plaintiff that he claims to be libeled 1 
the defendant makes such offer and publishes a 
reasonable retraction 1 and such offer is not accepted 1 
he may prove the alleged libel was published in good 
faith and with actual malice and unless the proof is 
successfully rebutted 1 the plaintiff shall recover 
only for any actual damages sustained. In no action 
for slander or libel s hall exemplary or punitive dam-
ages be allowed whether becaus e of actual malice 
or want of good fait or for any other reason. Proof 
of actual malice shall not enhance the damages re-
coverable for injury to the plaintiff's reputation. 
As Amended St. 1943 1 C 360 . 
In several other states similar statutes provide that the defen-
dant who makes a suitable retraction will be responsible only for 
the actual damages plaintiff can prove he sustained 1 and not for general 
damages. These states are Delaware 1 Florida 1 Georgia 1 Indiana I Iowa 1 
Kentucky 1 Minnesota 1 New Jersey 1 North Carolina 1 North Dakota 1 
Oklahoma 1 Utah I and Wisconsin. In most other states a sufficient 
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retraction will at least serve to reduce the amount of the general damages. 1 ,, 
Many objections have been raised regarding retraction statutes. Michi-
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li gan and Kansas declared their statutes unconstitutional. Illinois passed 1 
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a retraction law in 1895 and repealed it two years later. Georgia's 
'i 
·! 
.I statute of 1939 I similar to the present law in Massachusetts I was 
I 
I 
hailed by the press as a model law. Nevertheless I it was repealed in 
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What Constitutes a Retraction 
A libel suit was brought against the Boston Globe for the 
following story: 3 
LARCENY CHARGE 
Job Monaghan Ar:r_:ested At Wellesley: Accused 
of Taking Town Money for Work He Did Not Do: 
Formerly Assistant Engineer of Fire Department 
Much sensation has been caused by the arrest of 
Job Monaghan, a well - known resident and former 
town official, charged with larceny of the town 1 s 
money . Monaghan was placed in custody about 
8:30 this evening, and was soon bailed . 
According to the allegations of the complainant, 
Chief of Police Kingsbury, Monaghan received 
pay for work he did not perform . 
The charges are that Monaghan, during the five 
or six years he served as an assistant engineer 
of the town, kept a pair of horses in readiness 
to attach to Hose #3 and to drive that piece of 
apparatus in respons e to a fire alarm . If he did 
not answer in the first alarm, and there was no 
second, he received remuneration, but not as 
great as though Hose #3 had answered the first 
call. 
It is alleged that Monaghan charged the town for 
a hitch of the latter character on March 23 that 
he did not make but for which he was paid . The 
. . 
amount involved, it is understood, is less than 
$100. Whether any attempt to name any other date 
will be made on the part of the government is not 
stated. 
The Globe 1 s offer to print the following retraction was not 
:! accepted: 
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WAS NOT ARRESTED 
Globe's Report of Suit Against 
Mr. Monaghan Innacurate 
As there appeared in a publication of the Globe 
Newspaper of July 1, 1902, in an article relative 
to the charge against Job Monaghan of Wellesley 
for larceny and taking money that he did not work 
for, from the town, the statements that Monaghan 
was arrested at Wellesley, that he was placed in 
custody about 8:30 in the evening and was soon 
bailed are not true, the said Monaghan not being 
arrested, but cited or summoned to appear and an-
swer to the charge of larceny for trial, as the articl e 
otherwise states. 
Although nearly a year and a half after the publica -
tion, on being informed of the incorrectness of 
this statement , the Globe immediately offered to 
publish a retraction, or correction of anything 
that was wrong, but the offer not being accepted 
by the said Monaghan or his attorney, the Globe 
now publishes this retraction or correction of the 
circumstances in connection with Monaghan's 
trouble. 
· The court ruled that the foregoing was not a retraction . The 
jury returned for the plaintiff and awarded him $500. 
The Brockton Times, in an article about a sixteen year old boy , 
published the wrong name. The boy and his mother went immediately 
t o the Times' office to explain the mistake . A retraction appeared in 
a conspicious place in the next edition. In the ensuing libel suit, 
the court admitted the retraction as evidence in mitigation of damages, 
saying: 4 
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The publication of a retraction, complete in 
character and conspicious in position, might 
be found to have a material effect in diminish-
ing the mischief caus ed by the libel, and thus 
substantially reduce the damages sustained by 
the person libeled. 
In April of 19 41 the Boston Herald - Traveler reported that S was 
being sued by E for alienation of a ffection s of E 's wife. The article · 
referred to the "clandestine meetings and appointments," etc. The 
alienation case was tried the following February, the court finding for 
S, the defendant, on the grounds of no evidence . The subsequent story 
in the Herald-Traveler -was headlined , "No Evidence - Suit for 
Alienation Fails." In the ensuing suit for libel against the newspaper, 
the court refused to admit this "retraction" in evidence, ruling it to 
<:; 
be no retraction at all. " 
Five Boston newspapers were sued for libel in 1952 in a case 
involving mistaken identity . A Richard f.. Whitcomb had been tried 
and found guilty of larceny by a military court in Germany, sentenced 
to two years of hard labor, and dis missed from the service. The 
original story appeared in the Stars and Stripes, which reported that a 
Richard fl.. Whitcomb was so convicted . The story was picked up by 
the Associated Press and subsequently by the Boston newspapers (the 
Advertiser 1 Post, Globe, Herald and Traveler) . The Boston papers 1 
however 1 added biographical material definitely fixing the identity of 
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reputation 1 brigadier general in the army reserves 1 decorated, etc . 
After learning of their mistake, all five papers published retractions 
within a few days of the original article 1 completely exonerating the 
plaintiff. The jury I however I found the retractions had mitigated the 
damages to no extent. The court ruled that the total damages of 
$65,000. awarded were not excessive in view of the plaintiff's repu- · 
tation. 6 
Evidence in Mitigation 
In seeking to mitigate damages, a defendant is allowed to 
prove he published a libel in good faith , with reasonable grounds to 
believe it true. He is allowed to show the circumstances under which 
the libel was published to prove the absence of malice. 7 The 
Massachusetts statute states. 8 
In an action for libel, the defendant may allege 
and prove in mitigation of damages that the 
plaintiff already has brought action for or recover-
ed damages for, or has received or has agreed to 
receive compensation in respect of 1 substantially 
the same libel for which such action was brought. 
In an action for libel or slander , he may introduce 
in evidence, in mitigation of damages and in re-
buttle of evidence of actual malic'3 1 acts of the 
plaintiff which create a reasonable suspicion 
that the matters charged against him by the defen-
dant are true. 
As Amended St. 1943 1 C .361 
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9 
in a libel are not admissible in mitigation. 
The defendant may not show evidence of his own bad character 
in mitigation of damages . Thus in Howe v. Perry 10 the defendant 
was not allowed to prove that his own garralous character would 
lessen the effect of any defamatory charges he might make. 
Evidence of a provocative libel by the plaintiff upon the defen-
dant is admissible in mitigation of damages. Such provocation 1 
however 1 "must be very recent and retort its natural consequence," 
ll 
the court declared in the case of Conroy v . Fall River Herald. 
A politic al writer had attacked the plaintiff for his conduct as a state 
senator . Conroy 1 in a public speech 1 had "indulged in vulgar abuse" 
of the writer. Th~ alleged libels were published in answer to the 
speech. The writer called Conroy "a low grade creature of crass ig -
norance and stupid egotism . " He referred to Conroy as "a mean 1 
vicious 1 an_d contemptible liar . " He also published a cartoon showing 
the plaintiff in a "Political Dump~' surrounded by waste barrels marked 
"Gutter Methods." 
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CHAPTER X 
CRIMINAL LIBEL 
Introduction 
The publication of a false and malicious libel has always, by 
the common law of Massachusetts, been an offense punishable by 
indictment. Generally, wherever an action will lie for libel, without 
laying special damages, an indictment will also lie; also, wherever 
an action will lie for slander, without laying special damages, an 
indictment will lie for the same words if written and published. Ob-
scene libel and blasphemous libel are included in criminal libel. The 
gist of criminal libel is the tendency of a malicious defamatory pub-
lication to cause a breach of the peace. 
Development of the Law 
For many years, Massachusetts courts echoed the ancient 
English principle that "the greater the truth, the greater the libel." 
!! In trial after trial, judges refused to admit evidence of truth as a 
defense. It was generally supposed that the constitutional guarantees 
of freedom of speech and of the press would negate the English pre-
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cedent. However, in the first case under the constitution (Commonwealth ·. 
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v. Freeman 1 17 91) I Chief Justice Francis Dana held that the old 
common law of criminal libel had not been at all altered by the-con-
stitution and was still very much in force in Massachusetts. 1 In 
1801 Dana again refused to admit the truth in evidence in the prose-
cution of Abijah Adams 1 editor of the anti-Federalist Boston Independent 
Chronicle. Dana 1 in his decision/ called the common law "our 
cherished birthright." After Adams was released the following editorial 
statement appeared in the Chronicle: 2 
Yesterday 1 Mr. Abijah Adams was discharged from 
his imprisonment 1 after partaking of an adequate 
proportion of his birthright by a confinement of 
thirty days under the operation of the Common Law 
of England. 
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'I More indictments for criminal libel followed 1 with more decisions d 
based on the English law. Finally 1 the historical argument by Alexander li 
Hamilton in 1804 (People v. Crosswell) began to have its effect. 
Hamilton laid down the principle that "the liberty of the press consists 
in the right to publish with impunity truth with good motives and for 
justifiable ends 1 whether it respects government 1 magistracy I or 
individuals." The court adopted t his idea to the ·extent that truth 
could be published regarding public officials 1 if without malice. 
3 
Three years later 1 the Massachusetts Supreme Court took the 
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adopting the Hamilton doctrine so far as it related to candidates for 
office and public officials 0 This, of course, was only a partial step 0 
4 In this case the defendant was indicted for -libel against a public 
auctioneer, calling him a "liar , a scoundrel, a cheat, and a swindler 0" 
The defendant was not allowed to prove the truth of his statement and 
was found guilty o He moved for a new trial, where the court had this' 
to say about truth : 
c 
When any man shall consent to be a candidate 
for a public office conferred by the election of 
the people, he must be considered as putting his 
character in issue, so far as it may respect his 
fitness and qualifications for the office 0 
But the publication of a libel maliciously and 
with intent to defame, whether it be true or not, 
is clearly an offence against the law, on sound 
principles which must be adhered to so long as 
the restraint of all tendencies to the breach of 
the public peace, and to private animosity and 
revenge is salutory to the Commonwealth 0 
At last the courts were willing to admit truth in evidence in 
criminal libel trials, although in a very narrow sense 0 It is interesting 
to note that the defendant had libeled an appointive officer, thus 
he was still not allowed to prove the truth o He was sentenced to two 
months o 
As late as 182 5, the courts were still refusing to admit the 
truth in evidence in criminal libel. In Commonwealth v 0 Blanding 5 
1
' the court declared truth to be immaterial to the character of a libel as 
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a public offense, citing the Commonwealth v. Clapp decision that 
truth could be admitted only when the libel concerned an elected 
official . The court stated: 
If the doctrine be true that the gist or essence 
of the offense of libel is that it tends to provoke 
a breach of peace, • . . then it must follow that 
when the publication complained of is of a libelous 
nature, it must be taken to be of a malicious charac -
ter, unless the defendant shall within some of the 
known provisions of the law be admitted to prove, 
and shall in fact prove, that the allegations made 
are true, and that he had some warrantable purpose, 
inconsistent with a malicious intent, in causing 
the publication 
--
Two years after the Blanding case, in 1827, the Massachusetts 
legislature passed a statute making truth a defense in all criminal 
libels when published with good motives and for justifiable ends. The 
present statutory law regarding the defense of truth in criminal libel 
reads ~uch the same as that concerning civil libel: 6 
The defendant in a prosecution for writing or 
publishing a libel may introduce in evidence the 
truth of the matter contained in the publication 
charged as libelous, and the truth shall be a 
justification unless actual malice is proved. 
Prosecutions 
In 1847 the courts of Massachusetts made it perfectly clear that 
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libel was punishable as a crime under the common law. The defendant ·1 
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and malicious libel and appealed to a higher court. There , the defense 
argued that there existed no law by which the writing and publishing of 
a malicious libel could be prosecuted and punished. The prosecution 
cited numerous cases where such prosecutions were made under the 
common law . The exceptions of the defense were overruled. 7 
An article- published in the New England Galaxy headlined, 
"Look out for thieves," charged two men with boasting they had won 
money by gaming . According to the article, they had drugged a horse 
before a race . · The defendant in the ensuing prosecution for criminal 
libel attempted to prove he received his information from an extremely 
reputable person. This was declared not admissible in evidence to 
prove the truth . The court also refused to admit evidence of the bad 
8. 
character of the plaintiffs. The defendant was found guilty. 
Prosecutions for criminal libel have been maintained for 
charging a county sheriff with being "untrut hful, profane, a drinker, 
a libertine, beating prisoners, and making his jail a place of prosti-
!I tution." 9 The publisher of a letter in the Salem Evening News en-
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titled "A Malicious City Marshal," was indicted for criminal libel. 10 
Articles in the Somerville Evening Sun charging the mayor of that city 
with drunkeness and violation of the city liquor laws were the subject 
or a criminal prosecution in 1911 . 11 
In 1926 the author of articles published in Sandara, a Boston 
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libel . The article stated: 
Rev. G., having collected a hugh sum of money 
and after he had emptied the pockets of the weak -
lings and bigoted ones, went back to Lithuania. 
In Germany, he became acquainted with two young 
women and lived with them during all that time. 
After he had spent all the money , he remembered 
that there are left in America enough "imbeciles" 
and it is still possible to coax them not only to 
give him money, but also the · remaining Lithuanian 
Liberty Bonds. 
The court ruled the publication to be non-defamatory. No crime was 
charged to the plaintiff, and no misconduct was implied in the state-
ment that the plaintiff had lived with two women during his trip 
abroad. 12 
One of the most interesting prosecutions for criminal libel 
involved the famous Sacco-Vanzetti murder trial. The convicted 
murderers were refused a pardon by Governor Alvin Fuller of Massachu-
setts and were subsequently executed. A sympathizer exhibited, in 
front of the state house in Boston, a placard which read: "Fuller -
Murderer of Sacco and Vanzetti." In the trial the defendant insisted 
that his placard was not meant to be an accusation of murder, but a 
statement of the moral responsibility of the governor. The court, 
however, held that the words, in . their natural, usual sense, contained 
a charge of murder and were libelous per se. The court went on to give 
13 
a definition of criminal libel: 
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If its tendency was to make people restless and 
turbulent and had a t.endency to lead them into 
riot or insurrection or a breach of the peace, it 
is a criminal libel . 
Obscene, Blasphemous 1 and Group Libel -
Obscenity 1 blasphemy, and libel of groups are indictable 
~- ~.:::-
offenses which are included in the category of criminal libel. A study 
of obscenity is not called for here, but a review of certain cases 
serves to point out that this Commonwealth habitually sets itself up 
as a guardian of the public morals and is insidiously regressive in its 
restrictions. 
The defendant in an 1821 case 14 was indicted for publishing 
a "lewd and obscene print" contained in Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure, and for publishing that book which the court referred to as 
"lewd, wicked, scandalous, infamous, and obscene." In 1917 
a prosecution for criminal libel was maintained against the distributers 
16 
of pamphlets on birth control. 15 In another case, a member of the 
Watch and Ward Society persuaded a Boston bookseller to obtain a copy 
of a banned book. When the defendant did so, he was promptly prosecut-
ed. Over the objections of defense counsel, the court ruled this was 
a bona fide sale; the man was convicted. The name of the book, 
incidentally, does not appear in the court records. 
Another bookseller was indicted in 1930 for selling Dreiser' s 
American Tragedy. The court refused to admit the whole book in 
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evidence, overruling the objections of the defense. In his instructions 
to the jury, the judge made it very clear that the obscenity law then 
in effect made it a criminal offense to print, sell, or distribute any-
thing that contained obscenities. He stated: 
It is entirely immaterial whether other books are 
as bad or worse or better than thi s •.. You are 
not trying any book except this, and only such 
parts of this as the government complains of ..• 
It makes no difference what the object in writing 
this book was, or what its whole tone is if these 
pages that are complained of, the language that 
is set out in the bill of particulars, is in your 
mind obscene, impure, indecent, and manifestly 
tending to the corruption of youth, then you must 
find a verdict of guilty. 
The bookseller was convicted. 17 
The law was amended that same year (1930) allowing juries 
to consider the entire content of anything charged as obscene. The 
wording of the law was changed from "that which contains" to 
"that which is" obscene: 
Whoever imports, prints, sells, or distributes 
a book, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, phono-
graph record, or other thing which is obscene, 
indecent, or impure or manifestly tends to corrupt 
the morals of youth, or an obscene, indecent or 
impure print, picture, figure, image, or descrip-
tion, manifestly tending to corrupt the morals of 
youth, or introduces into a family, school, or 
place of education, or buys, procures, receives, 
or has in ,his possession any such book, pamphlet 
ballad, printed picture, figure, image, or other 
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thing, either for the purpose of sale, exhibition, 
loan, or circulation, or with intent to introduce 
the same into a family, school or plac e of 
education shall be punished by imprisonment 
for not more than two years or by a fine or not 
less than $100 nor more than $1000. 18 
A man indicted under this revised version of the law in 1945 
for possessing and selling the novel Strange Fruit could thus offer 
the entire book in evidence. The court, however , declared that 
sex could be found on "every fifth page . " The jury found the defen-
·~ dant guilty. 19 
In 1833 Abner Kneeland , editor and publisher of the Boston 
I 
!! 
i, Investigator, was indicted for publishing "a scandalous, impious, 
obscene, blasphemous, and profane libel." The essence of the 
II 
'I editorial was Kneeland 1 s disagreement with the Universalists. He 
referred to their god as a "chimera of their imagination" and the 
II 
li 
li 
li 
I 
I 
'I 
" 
story of C hrist as "fable and fiction." Miracles were "mere tricks i' 
I 
., 
' I, 
,i 
and impostures" and there was "no such thing" as eternal life. Knee-
land was SE:!nteneed to three months in prison . He appealed the sen-
tence and was convicted again . . He moved for a new trial where he 
argued that he was denying the Universalist 1 s god , not God (with a 
capital G) and questioned the constitutionality of the law under which 
he was indicted . He cited Articles 2 and 6 of the Declaration _of Rights 
,, 
1 on freedom of religion and of the press. A great argument ensued, but 
I, 
' 
in the end Kneeland was sentenced to 60 days . 20 
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The law under which Kneeland was indicted still stands (in 
revised form) on the books of the Commonwealth, 21 although his 
was the last conviction for blasphemy in this state: 
Whoever wilfully blasphemes the holy name of God 
by denying, cursing, or contumeliously reproaching 
God, his creation,· government, or final judging of 
the world 1 or by cursing or contumeliously reproach-
ing Jesus Christ or the Holy Ghost, or by cursing 
or contumeliously reproaching, or exposing to con-
tempt and ridicule the holy word of God contained in 
the holy scriptures shall be punished by imprisonment 
in jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of 
not more than $300 and may also be bound to good 
behaviour. 
In 1943 the Massachusetts legislature passed a law making 
libel of groups because of race, color, or religion a criminal offense: 
Whoever publishes any false written or printed 
material with intent to maliciously promote hatred 
of any group of persons in the Commonwealth be-
cause of race, color, or religion shall be guilty 
of libel and shall be punished by a fine of not 
more than one thousand dollars or by imprison-
ment for not more than one year, or both. The defen-
dant may prove in defense that the publication was 
privileged or was not malicious. Prosecutions under 
this section shall be instituted only by the Attorney 
General or by the district attorney for the district 
in which the alleged libel was published. (1943, 
223, approved, April 31, 1943) 
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CONCLUSION 
The evolution of the law of libel in Massachusetts has 
been a crazy quilt of asymmetrical development. It is always a dis-
appointment to learn that the ··brave little. bands of Pilgrims" who 
settled this Commonwealth were not exactly the freedom-loving liberals 
we eulogize. The suppression of dissension, first in religion, later 
in politics, did not auger well for the development of freedom of ex-
pression , nor just libel laws. No sooner were the restraints of pre-
censorship lifted, than legal prosecutions for libel began in earnest. 
Unfortunately, we cannot blame the British - it becomes increasingly 
clear in the historical analysis that whether the British governors, 
under the Colonial Charter, or the Colonists themselves were in charge 
of the press, the general administration of justice was reactionary. 
The picture is not all black, however. Massachusetts redeemed 
her .self on several occasions. The trial of Thomas Maule, as early as 
1695, was a good omen for the future. Maule , 40 years before the 
Zenger trial, propounded the principle that the full responsibility for 
the administration of justice belonged to the jury. Governor Shute's 
losing battle for the preservation of censorship was another harbinger 
of freedom and progress. The trial of John Checkley in 1724 advocated 
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the principle that the jury, not the judge 1 was competent to decide 
questions of libel, anticipating the Fox Libel Act of England by 
60 years. 
Massach sett s leaders are also to be respected for their 
insistance on a bill of rights in both federal and state constitutions. 
However I it must be admitted that more prosecutions ensued under 
the constitution in the free state than under British rule, where 
juries were reluctant to indict. Long tedious arguments were to follow 
before truth was recognized as a defense to libel, in 1827. 
The statutory and common laws regarding libel in Massachusetts 
Ji are generally in agreement with American juris prudence. Definitions 
I 
I 
I 
l 
' I 
1] 
'I 
of libel are generally consistant. Truth is a defense to libel in all 
states 1 with minor variations. Decisions regarding the defenses of 
privilege and fair comment vary little from state to state. 
In many instances where Massachusetts jurisprudence is out 
of step with the rest of the nation 1 such dissent is in the direction of 
progress. Punitive damages are prohibited by statute. The retraction 
law is liberal and progressive. Up-to-date legislation has been enacted 
in consideration of the special circumstances surrounding radio and 
television broadcasting. The group libel law is a legislative feat of 
which to be proud 1 an important contribution to the future of civil 
rights. 
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On the other hand 1 statutes and decisions regarding blasphemous 
and obscene libel have been consistantly reactionary. The Common-
wealth is extremely stuffy about morals and religion. Nonetheless 1 
regressive views on religious and literary expression are merely logical 
and consistant in a state long notorious for "blue law" legislation. 
Reviewing the situation compositely 1 one may only conclude . 
that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is 1 in general, progressive 
regarding libel laws . In view of popular conceptions and humorous 
commentary associated with this state, this is 1 indeed 1 a conclusion 
arrived at with considerable, pleasant surprise. 
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